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A Critical Analysis Of Continuing
Establishment Clause Flux As Illustrated
By Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992)
And Graduation Prayer Case Law: Can
Mutual Tolerance Reconcile Dynamic
Principles Of Religious Diversity And
Human Commonality?
Christian M. Keiner*
INTRODUCTION
Establishment Clause analysis in the Supreme Court of the United
States remains in a state of flux," despite the High Court's recent
graduation invocation and benediction decision entitled Lee v.
Weisman,2 a case widely expected to break new Establishment
Clause ground. The Court's plurality decision in Lee and actions by
* J.D. with Distinction, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 1980, Member
Order of the Coif; B.A. with High Honors, University of California, 1977. The author represented
the Morongo Unified School District in Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d. 863, 809
P.2d. 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 3026 (1992).
The author gratefully acknowledges the research and editorial assistance of Ms. Nannette
Stomberg, as well as the dedicated word-processing skills of Ms. Lisa Yount. The author also
appreciates the many discussions regarding these issues with co-counsel Ms. Terd A. DeMitchell, Mr.
L Stanton Bair, and Mr. Keith J. Bray, and the support of the students, administrators and Board of
Education of the Morongo Unified School District. However, the views expressed are solely the
author's.
1. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863,885, 809 P.2d 809, 821, 281 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 46 (1991) (Lucas, CJ., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).
2. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
3. See Linda Greenhouse, Justices Appear Wary In Argument Over Prayer At School
Graduations, N.Y. TIMES (National Ed.), Nov. 7, 1991, at Al (stating "the case, which could well
be a vehicle for unsettling decades of precedent on the relationship between church and State, is one
of the most important of the Supreme Court's term"); Laura Mecoy, High Court Bans Graduation
Prayers, Strong Bearing on California Case, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 25, 1992, at Al (stating
"Wednesday's ruling shocked the High Court's critics and supporters because they had expected the
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the Court such as granting certiorari in at least two Establishment
Clause cases in the 1992 term4 are indicative of the continuing
unresolved state of Establishment Clause law. Also indicative was the
Court's denial of the petition for certiorari in Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District,5 a case argued by this author in the
California trial, appellate, and supreme courts, which struck down
student-planned graduation invocations and benedictions as
unconstitutional, while at the same time vacating and remanding for
further consideration in light of Lee a Fifth Circuit decision entitled
Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,6 a case approving
graduation prayer initiated, drafted, and presented by students.7
Counsel sailing into uncharted Establishment Clause waters finds
a variety of Supreme Court approaches. Early Supreme Court
Establishment Clause opinions stressed an absolute separation
between church and state.' Later majority decisions rejected such an
absolutist approach,9 focusing instead upon an historical analysis."°
Currently, counsel involved in an Establishment Clause dispute will
conservative justices to open the floodgates for new litigation by devising a new interpretation of the
Constitution's ban on the government's establishment of religion").
4. See generally Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381
(2nd Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (New York decision involving
use of school auditorium for religious activities); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d
1190 (9th Cir. 1992), cert granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3219 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (Arizona decision
regardinj furnishing state-financed sign language interpreter forprivate sectarian high school student).
5. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992).
6. 930 F.2d416 (SthCir. 1991),cert. granted and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
7. Id. at 417. At the close of the 1991 Term the High Court also declined to hear two
additional education cases implicating Establishment Clause issues; see Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d
1047, 1056 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a Denver school district did not violate the Establishment
Clause by forbidding a Denver public school teacher to display on his desk and silently read the
Bible during class), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3025 (1992); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1078
(1lth Cir. 1991) (upholding University of Alabama directions to a professor not to inteject religious
beliefs into the classroom), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).
8. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) ("[s]eparation means
separation, not something less"); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). See also
infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (discussing the absolute separation approach).
9. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 678 (1984); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 670 (1970); see also infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (discussing the absolute
separation approach).
10. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 91-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (setting forth an historical analysis); infra notes 81-88
and accompanying text (discussing cases utilizing an historical analysis).
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find that First Amendment jurisprudence has resulted in the evolution
of multiple identifiable "tests" for Establishment Clause issues, the
most well-known of which is the often repeated trilogy of "purpose,"
"effect," and "entanglement" set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court notably has declined to limit itself
to any single "test,"' 12 or even a single "guideline," 13 in this
delicate area of constitutional law. In fact, the majority of justices
now on the Court have at one time or another criticized or expressed
reservations regarding Lemon.14 Even when the Court has stated it
was applying Lemon, various justices have critiqued and
reformulated the Lemon test and, in the process, have put forward
competing "endorsement" and "coercion" analyses."1
The High Court's decision last term in Lee left the state of flux
unresolved. While the majority of the Court in Lee determined
graduation invocations and benedictions sponsored by public school
district officials were impermissible,16 the Court did not resolve the
larger Establishment Clause issue of which standards or principles
apply in evaluating an Establishment Clause case that is not fact-
specific to Lee. Thus, bench and bar must continue to wrestle with
difficult Establishment Clause issues without definitive guidance
from the High Court. The most basic question is what law to apply to
11. 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon
decision).
12. See Lynchv. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,679 (1984) (emphasizing the Court's "unwillingness
to be confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area").
13. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (portraying the Lemon trilogy as "'no
more than [a] helpful signpos[t]' in dealing with Establishment Clause challenges"); Committee for
Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 789-90 (1973) (quoting Chief Justice Burger in Lemon, 403 U.S
at 614) (noting that "constitutional analysis is not a 'legalistic minuet in which precise rules and
forms must govern'").
14. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 655
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist,
CJ., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Roemer v.
Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
15. See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting forth "endorsement" analysis); County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at
659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (setting forth "coercion" analysis); see infra
notes 89-100 and accompanying text (discussing endorsement and coercion approaches).
16. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992).
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a given set of facts. But larger questions remain. Why are judicial
splits of opinion in Establishment Clause cases not only unresolved,
but widening? Why does the Establishment Clause create such
judicial confusion, consequently making it difficult, if not impossible,
for public agency counsel to render practical, comprehensible
advice?17
The length, breadth, eloquence, and sheer number of judicial
opinions in graduation prayer cases alone attest to the struggles
within both trial and appellate courts."8 Moreover, church-state
issues, particularly in public schools, have been identified as part of
a larger societal culture war, 19 and the courts must be presumed
aware of the public's strong reaction to the 1960s school day prayer
decisions.2" The public's ongoing interest in religion and religious
practices remains high,2 and judicial opinions often reference the
17. This sentiment is not unique to the author. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Our cases interpreting and applying the purpose test have made
such a maze of the Establishment Clause that even the most conscientious governmental officials can
only guess what motives will be held unconstitutional").
18. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S. CL 2649 (resulting in four diverse opinions from the High Court);
Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), aftd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (resulting in three opinions
by the First Circuit Court of Appeals); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809
P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. CL 3026 (1992) (resulting in separate
opinions from six of the seven California Supreme Court justices, collectively rated "Best Opinion
of the Year" by California Lawyer); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 45,262
Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809,281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991) (resulting in
two opinions by the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District); Stein v. Plainwell Community Seh.,
822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987) (resulting in three opinions by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
this graduation prayer case); see also Annual Supreme Court Review: Plunging Into the Political
Thicket, CA. LAW., June, 1992, at 31-36.
19. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CuLTuRE WARs: THE STRuGoLE TO DavNrE AMERICA 197-224
(1991).
20. See RODNEY K. SMm*,1 PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION, A CASE STUDY IN
CONSTruTnONAL INTERPRErAION 175 (1987) ("Public furor which was without equal in any prior
case before the Supreme Court arose after the Engle decision was announced).
21. See HAROLD BLooM, THE AMERICAN REuoION: m mEROEN CE OF THE PoST-
CmIsTIN NATION 38-39 (1992) (noting "[t]he central fact about American life, as we enter the final
decade of the twentieth century, is that our religiosity is everywhere"); see also George W. Cornell,
Religious Beliefs a Key to Political Leaning, Poll Finds, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 5, 1992, Scene,
at 10 (publishing a recent survey conducted by the Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics at the
University of Akron concluding Americans are a very religious people); Gibbs, America's Holy War,
TIME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 60, 64 [hereinafter America's Holy War] (setting forth a recent Time/CNN
Poll on Religion). The recent Time/CNN poll set forth the following responses regarding religion in
public life:
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strong religious interests of the American public and the historic
place of religion in American life.' This overall interest of the
public in civic religious practices remains strong, especially in the
school context.'
In addition to public sentiment, there is the unstated but real fact
that each judge before whom such a matter is brought, though duty-
bound to interpret and enforce the federal and state constitutions
regardless of personal convictions, brings to the case personal
In American life:
How much religious influence is there?
Too much - 11%
Too little - 55%
Right amount - 30%
Is religious influence:
Increasing? - 27%
Decreasing? - 65%
Do you favor or oppose:
Displaying symbols like a Nativity scene or a menorah on government property?
26% oppose, 67% favor
Removing references to God from all oaths of public office?
74% oppose, 20% favor
Would you vote for a presidential candidate who did not believe in God?
63% no, 29% yes.
America's Holy War, supra, at 64.
22. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) (stating "[w]e are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being"); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53
Cal. 3d 863, 892 n.5, 809 P.2d 809, 827 n.5, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 52 n.5 (1991) (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring).
23. See America's Holy War, supra note 21, at 64 (setting forth the following responses
regarding religion in schools). Additionally, the poll received the following responses:
In American schools:
Which of these activities should be allowed on school grounds?
Voluntary Bible classes - 78%
Voluntary Christian fellowship groups - 78%
Prayers before athletic games - 73%
Church choir practice - 56%
Do you favor or oppose:
Allowing children to say prayers in public schools?
18% oppose, 78% favor
Allowing children to spend a moment in silent meditation in public schools?
9% oppose, 89% favor.
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feelings, beliefs, and a religious or non-religious background.24 The
struggle to interpret and enforce federal and state Establishment
Clauses also necessarily involves, particularly at the federal level, the
historical purposes and intent of the Constitution's framers.' A
large part of the Establishment Clause debate concerns dynamic
principles of religious diversity and human commonality in a
pluralistic American society, principles which, although inchoate, are
often discussed in Supreme Court opinions.26
To ensure the reader's general understanding of the state of flux
in Establishment Clause law, Part I of this Article will briefly review
the primary Establishment Clause standards formulated by the
Supreme Court of the United States in decisions leading up to the
Court's recent decision in Lee v. Weisman.' Next, the Article will
provide a concise analysis of each justice's recent position regarding
the applicable standard as reflected in the Lee decision.28 Part III of
the Article will then focus on the underlying judicial assumptions
regarding key issues of religious diversity and human commonality;
assumptions that are apparent in Establishment Clause case law and
particularly noteworthy in determining the outcome of the public
school graduation cases. 29 To illustrate how these assumptions
continue to impact judicial Establishment Clause analysis, this
24. This practical reality has spawned significant academic debate. See, e.g., MICHAEL J.
PERRY, MORALITY, PoLtrrcs AND LAw, A BICENNiAL ESSAY 121-79 (1988).
25. See Walz v. Tax Commn, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (noting the Establishment Clause
cannot be interpreted "with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate constitutional objective
as illuminated by history.")
26. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,589-91
(1989) (stating "[p]recisely because of the religious diversity that is our national heritage, the
Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights.. ."); id. at 613, 619 (Blackmun, L, concurring)
(display of menorah at Christmas time is not "an endorsement of religious faith but simply a
recognition of cultural diversity"); id. at 627 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "[W]e live in a
pluralistic society. Our citizens come from diverse religious traditions or adhere to no particular
religious beliefs at all"); id. at 679 (Kennedy, ., concurring) (stating Justice Kennedy's view that
"principles of the Establishment Clause and our Nation's historic traditions of diversity and pluralism
allow communities to make reasonable judgments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgment
of holidays with both cultural and religious respects"); see also infra notes 127-222 and
accompanying text (illustrating further the presence of these principles in Establishment Clause case
law).
27. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see infra notes 34-100 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 127-222 and accompanying text.
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Article will then engage in a critical analysis of the California
Supreme Court's decision in Sands v. Morongo Unified School
District," a case in which key opinions specifically reflect each
active conflicting strand of Establishment Clause law.31 Finally, Part
IV of this Article will. call for a fresh re-thinking of certain key
assumptions made by the bench and bar, illustrated again by critical
references to the opinions in Lee and Sands,32 and conclude by
questioning whether genuine mutual tolerance can create a society
and jurisprudence where individual conscience is protected, long-
standing community traditions including a religious component may
continue, and where religion and the State do not end up increasingly
hostile towards each other.33
I. BACKGROUND: THE "TESTS"
It was not until 1971 that the Court adopted the Lemon' trilogy,
which is now well-known as the operative "test," to be applied, or at
least acknowledged, in every Establishment Clause case.35
However, even when the Supreme Court purports to apply the Lemon
test, certain identifiable approaches that have developed both prior to
30. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992).
31. See infra notes 223-308 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 309-15 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 315-18 and accompanying text.
A caveat. The perspective of the author is that of a public agency counsel in private practice
who both successfully and unsuccessfully argued the California graduation prayer case before the
trial, appellate, and state supreme courts. This Article does not claim to be that of a detached scholar;
rather, whatever insights the author gained came primarily from experience. It is hoped this Article
will serve to assist counsel and the bench engaged in Establishment Clause litigation. It is also hoped
this Article will contribute to the on-going debate regarding the future of the Establishment Clause,
particularly assisting any much-needed attempt to craft a middlepath between those pressure groups
who seek to unconstitutionally and unconscionably use the powers of government to impose their
religious beliefs on others, and those who conversely seek to use the judiciary to sanitize all facets
of religion from public life and discourse.
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon decision and
subsequent cases considering application of the Lemon test). To invalidate a practice or law under
Lemon, a court must determine: (1) The statute or action in question has a secular purpose, (2) the
principal or primary effect of the statute or action is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,
and (3) the statute or practice does not foster excessive government entanglement with religion.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
407
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and since the Lemon decision often flow in and out of judicial
opinions, affecting the outcome more profoundly than the purported
application of the Lemon test itself. These identifiable approaches to
analyzing an Establishment Clause case will be categorized for
discussion purposes as: (1) The absolutist approach; (2) the
acknowledgement and accommodation approach; (3) the secular
purpose and effect approach;36 (4) the historical analysis approach;
(5) the endorsement of religion approach; and (6) the coercion
approach.37
A. Absolutist Approach
Early Establishment Clause analysis introduced the concept of an
absolute separation between church and state by way of Thomas
Jefferson's wall metaphor.38 In Everson v. Board of Education39
the Court set forth an often repeated absolutist summary of minimum
principles as follows:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the federal government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid a religion, aid all religions or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious belief or disbelief, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called or
whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
36. These prongs were later joined with excessive governmental entanglement with religion
to form the Lemon test. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing Lemon).
37. This review of the pertinent approaches is not intended to be an exhaustive compilation
of all case law applying a particular approach. Rather, it is intended to orient the general reader to
the key approaches to further illustration and discussion on the underlying causes for the continued
Establishment Clause flux.
38. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 15-16 (1947) (stating "[i]n the words of Jefferson,
the clause against the establishment of religion was intended to erect a 'wall of separation between
church and state").
39. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
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nor the federal government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
40
Nevertheless, the idea that "the First Amendment erected a wall
between Church and State which must be kept high and
impregnable"4 ' has subsequently been tempered by the Supreme
Court. For example, in Zorach v. Clauson42 the Court upheld a New
York City program permitting public schools to release students from
class during school hours so the students could attend religious
instruction or devotional exercises.43 In so doing, the Court
conceded that insofar as "free exercise" or "establishment" of
religion was concerned, separation between church and state must be
"complete and unequivocal." However, the Court noted that the
First Amendment does not require there to be separation "in every
and all respects."45
More recently, in Lynch v. Donnelly,46 the Court specifically
rejected the absolutist approach, characterizing the approach as
"simplistic" and defining an approach which examines the actual
effect of the law or practice.4' However, the absolutist approach is
40. I at 15-16.
41. McColium v. Board of Educ, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
42. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
43. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 312.
44. Id
45. Id In Zorach the Court stated:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be
a separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other. That
is the common sense of the matter. Otherwise the state and religioIn would be aliens to
each other-hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.
Id.
46. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
47. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678. The Court stated:
n our modem, complex society, whose traditions and constitutional underpinnings
rest on and encourage diversity and pluralism in all areas, an absolute approach in
applying the Establishment Clause is simplistic and has been uniformly rejected by the
Court.
Rather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct or statutes that
confer benefits or give special recognition to religion in general or to one faith-as an
absolutist approach would dictate--the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or
official conduct to determine whether, in reality, it establishes a religion or religious faith,
or tends to do so.
409
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not a dead letter. Indicative of its perseverance is then-Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree 48 a 1985 decision
involving an Establishment Clause challenge to Alabama's statute
authorizing a period of silence for meditation or voluntary prayer.4 ,
In Wallace, Justice Rehnquist argued the First Amendment was
"designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and
perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects... [but does not]
requir[e] neutrality on the part of government between religion and
irreligion."5 Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace demonstrates
that the absolute separation theory retains vitality and is a continuing
source of dispute among the justices of the Supreme Court. Thus, the
absolutist approach cannot be ignored by a practitioner entering the
Establishment Clause arena.
B. Acknowledgment and Accommodation Approach
By declining to follow the absolutist approach only five years
after adhering to it in Everson v. Board of Education,51 the Supreme
Court in Zorach v. Clauson initiated a vein of law focusing upon
acknowledgment and accommodation of religious beliefs and
practices.52 Specifically, the Zorach Court asserted:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.
We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows
no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the
zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
53
Id This rejection followed a discussion by the Court focusing on the history of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 673-78.
48. 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985).
49. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40-41.
50. Id at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
52. 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
53. Id. The Court went on to observe:
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by
adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the
410
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The acknowledgement and accommodation approach reappeared
in both the holiday display cases, Lynch v. Donnelly54 and County
of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union.55 For example, in
Lynch, the Court invoked what it described as an "unbroken history
of official acknowledgment by all three branches of government of
the role of religion in American life"56 to hold that the city of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island had a secular purpose for including a
nativity scene in its Christmas display, that the city had not
impermissibly advanced religion, and that including the creche did
not create excessive entanglement between religion and govern-
ment.
5 7
The Court's decision in County ofAllegheny further illustrates the
Court's debate about the acknowledgment and accommodation
approach, particularly showing the division among the Justices
regarding what constitutes appropriate accommodation. Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens and
O'Connor, held that a Christmas creche prominently displayed in the
county courthouse with an angel bearing a banner proclaiming
"Gloria in Excelis Deo!" ("Glory to God in the Highest!") sent "an
unmistakable message that [the county government] supports and
promotes the Christian praise to God that is the creche's religious
message," thus violating the Establishment Clause.5" According to
Justice Blackmun, the government can acknowledge Christmas as a
cultural phenomenon, but under the First Amendment the
government cannot observe Christmas as a Christian holy day by
suggesting that people should praise God for the birth of Jesus.5 9
In contrast to the lack of accommodation for the Christmas
display, Justice Blackmun's decision held that a menorah displayed
at the city-county building next to a Christmas tree and a sign bearing
the message that the city of Pittsburgh "salutes liberty" did not
public service to their spiritual needs.
54. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
55. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
56. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 674.
57. Id. at 685.
58. County ofAUegheny, 492 U.S. at 600.
59. Id. at 601.
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violate the Establishment Clause.' The Court reasoned that, given
the display's particular physical setting, the city's overall holiday
display must be understood as conveying the city's secular
recognition of different traditions for celebrating the holiday
season.
61
A different vision of accommodation was set forth in County of
Allegheny by Justice Kennedy's dissent, joined by Justices White and
Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. While grudgingly invoking the
effect prong of Lemon to uphold the validity of displaying a creche
in the county courthouse and a menorah in the city-county
building,62 Justice Kennedy stated:
Government policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support
for religion are an accepted part of our political and cultural heritage...
[and] the Establishment Clause permits government some latitude in
recognizing the central role of religion in society .... 63
Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the majority's approach was
contrary to values expressed in the Establishment Clause because it
obsessively resisted all but the most secular and carefully scripted
forms of accommodation.64
60. Ii at 620.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 655-57 (Kennedy, J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
stated he was "content" with the application of the Lemon test by the majority, but did not wish "to
be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as our primary guide in this difficult area." IL at
655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
64. Id at 677-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
concluded that the majority's approach:
[Clontradicts important values embodied in the Clause. Obsessive, implacable resistance
to all but the most carefully scripted and secularized forms of accommodation requires this
Court to act as a censor, issuing national decrees as to what is orthodox and what is not
.... [Tihe only Christmas the State can acknowledge is one in which references to
religion have been held to a minimum.
Id.
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C. Purpose, Effect, and Entanglement-Putting Together the Lemon
Test
1. Purpose and Effect Approach
Approximately ten years after first advancing the acknow-
ledgement and accommodation approach in Zorach, two key school
prayer cases emerged, specifically barring state-mandated prayer in
schools.6" Because they occurred in the elementary/ secondary
school environment, both these decisions have significant
precedential influence.6 However, one of these decisions, Abington
School District v. Schempp,67 is also significant for its emphasis on
what would ultimately become both the purpose and effect prongs of
the tripartite Lemon test."
In Abington, the Supreme Court of the United States was faced
with companion cases presenting the issue of the constitutionality of
a public school beginning its day with readings from the Bible.' In
65. See Eagle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schemp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963). In Engle, the Supreme Court held that by requiring a prayer acknowledging dependence upon
and asking the blessings of "Almighty God" to be recited in each class in the presence of a teacher
at the beginning of each school day, the State of New York had adopted a practice "wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause." Id. at 422-24.
66. See, e.g., Le v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2658 (1992) (utilizing Establishment Clause
precedent arising in the school context to illustrate the Court's "heightened concern" with prayer and
other religious exercises in the elementary and secondary school context). It is clear the influence of
Abington and Engel extends beyond the mere factual similarity of settings. For example, to Justice
Kennedy, Abington and Engel illustrate the risk of "indirect coercion" prayer exercises present,
particularly in the context of schools. IM Although Justice Kennedy does not elaborate in Lee
regarding the reasons prayer in the school context can especially instill the appearance of employing
the "machinery of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy," it is clear that when Establishment
Clause issues arise in elementary and secondary school settings, special significance and protection
is presumed. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (noting that "[t]he
public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting
our common destiny. In no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out derisive forces than in
our schools."); Wallace v. Jaffee, 472 U.S. 38,60-61 (1985) (declaring "[t]hat [Boards of Education]
are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection ofConstitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes").
67. 347 U.S. 203 (1963).
68. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also infra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text (discussing Lemon).
69. Abington, 374 U.S. at 205.
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striking down the practice as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
stated that in order to pass constitutional muster, the enactment or
action in question must have a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.70 Abington
was first in the line of Supreme Court decisions articulating the
purpose and effect test and applying them to Establishment Clause
cases within the public school setting.7 1
2. Government Entanglement Prong Added to Create The
Lemon Test
By 1970, with the Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the
Court added a third prong to the purpose and effect inquiry
established by Abington-namely "excessive government entangle-
ment with religion."72 In Lemon, an opinion holding unconsti-
tutional statutory programs in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island which
provided financial support to church-related educational institutions
through teacher salary reimbursements or enhancements, 73 Chief
Justice Burger stated that every Establishment Clause analysis must
begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by
prior SupremeCourt decisions.74 Justice Burger went on to identify
three tests that he believed could be gleaned from prior decisions: (1)
The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) the statute's
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; and (3) the statute must not encourage excessive
70. lML at 222. The Court wrote:
[What are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative
power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures
of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Id
71. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38
(1985); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583; Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55; Stone,
449 U.S. at 40 (exemplifying Supreme Court decisions applying Lemon).
73. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
74. Id at 612.
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government entanglement with religion.75 Chief Justice Burger went
on to analyze the statutes under each prong to determine that while
the statutes had the appropriate secular purpose and effect,76 they
failed the entanglement prong because both states would be involved
in qualifying and monitoring the teachers receiving state aid to ensure
those teachers successfully segregated their religious beliefs from
their secular educational duties.77
Since its publication, the Lemon decision's three-pronged test has
become a force with which to contend in all Establishment Clause
decisions. 7' The Lemon formulation subsequently has had both
detractors79 and defenders" on the High Court. Thus, counsel in
an Establishment Clause case must continue to examine the tangled
web of Establishment Clause opinions which consider Lemon.
D. Historical Analysis Approach
Although Lemon has become the standard test in Establishment
Clause cases, in Marsh v. Chambers"1 the High Court did not
reference or apply Lemon. Instead, the Court conducted an historical
analysis to uphold the commencement of legislative sessions with
75. Id at 612-13.
76. Id. at 613-14.
77. 1d at 627.
78. See LAWRENCE H. TRmF, AMERICAN CONsTUTONAL LAw § 14-9 (2d ed. 1988) (noting
that the Supreme Court has applied the Lemon framework in all but one Establishment Clause case
since Lemon was decided in 1971).
79. See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing opinions questioning the applicability
of, or simply criticizing, the Lemon test).
80. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,63 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell set forth
the following defense of the Lemon test:
I write separately to express additional views and to respond to criticism of the three-
pronged Lemon test. Lemon identifies standards that have proved useful in analyzing case
after case both in our decisions and in those of other courts. It is the only coherent test
a majority of the Court has ever adopted. Only once since our decision in Lemon, supra
have we addressed an Establishment Clause issue without resort to its three-pronged test.
Lemon, supra, has not been overruled or its test modified. Yet, continued criticism of it
could encourage other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause cases on an ad
hoe basis.
Id
81. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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invocations.8 2 Many decisions by the Supreme Court interpreting
the Establishment Clause have used an historical analysis to discern
the purpose or intent of the drafters to assist the determination of the
constitutionality of a specific action or statute.8 3 Indeed, one year
prior to Lemon, in Walz v. Tax Commission," the Supreme Court
noted the importance of history in illuminating underlying
constitutional objectives.'
While an historical analysis is often invoked by the Supreme
Court in the area of constitutional interpretation, counsel arguing
such an approach in an Establishment Clause case should be wary for
the simple reason that history itself is frequently a point of
contention, particularly with the justices of the Supreme Court. For
example, in his dissenting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree,8 6 then
Justice Rehnquist, conducted a detailed historical analysis to discredit
the absolutist separationist's Jeffersonian wall metaphor, 7 itself an
historical approach at one time advocated by the Supreme Court."8
E. Endorsement Reformulation
During the 1980's, Justice O'Connor began formulating a
revision of the Lemon trilogy focusing upon principles of government
endorsement or sponsorship of religion. 9 In her concurring opinion
in Wallace v. Jaffree, Justice O'Connor stated that the central
82. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-92.
83. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-33 (1962).
84. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
85. Walz, 397 U.S. at 671.
86. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
87. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92-107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see supra notes 48-50 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace).
88. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing early application of the historical
analysis approach); see also Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (declaring that
according to Jefferson, the Establishment Clause was intended to erect a wall of separation between
church and state).
89. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,690 (O'Connor, ., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, ., concurring); see also Donald L Beschle, The Conservative as
Liberal: The Religion Clauses, LiberalNeutrality, and the Approach ofJustice O'Connor, 62 NoTRE
DAME L REv. 151 (1987); Note, Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARV. L
REV. 1606, 1647 (1987) (law review articles discussing Justice O'Connor's endorsement theory).
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principle of an endorsement analysis focuses on the Establishment
Clause's prohibition of the government taking a position on questions
of religious belief, or making adherence to any religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community. This
analysis is made from the viewpoint of the reasonable observer.9
The endorsement approach seeks to render the Lemon trilogy
more flexible, primarily by combining the purpose and effect prongs
and providing these prongs with an analytical framework by
increasing the judicial ability to review historical factors and
context.92 The emerging Lemon endorsement analysis is highly
context specific, requiring each government practice to be judged
according to its unique circumstances, history, and ubiquity. 93
According to Justice O'Connor:
Under this view, Lemon's inquiry as to the purpose and effect of a statute
requires courts to examine whether government's purpose is to endorse
religion and whether the statute actually conveys a message of
endorsement .... The task for the court is to sort out those statutes and
government practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of
religious liberty protected by the First Amendment.94
F. Principles of Coercion Emerge
A principle that has arisen to compete with Justice O'Connor's
endorsement analysis is illustrated in County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union.9  In County of Allegheny, Justice
Kennedy in dissent, with the support of four justices, rejected the
90. Wallace 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). According to Justice O'Connor, "It]he relevant issue
is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools." Id
92. Id at 69-70, 74-76 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
93. County of Allegheny v. American Civil I'berties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 606 (1989); see
id at 625, 629-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating "It]he purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon test
represent the two aspects of the City's action").
95. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
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endorsement approach9 6 and formulated an alternative coercion
test.97 Justice Kennedy's emerging coercion analysis, which he
further developed and strongly relied upon in his opinion in Lee v.
Weisman,98 focuses both upon history and the purpose of the
Establishment Clause9 to determine whether a challenged practice,
in reality, coerces participation or support of a religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so." While Justice Kennedy's dissent in
County ofAllegheny put forward the competing coercion approach,
it left for future cases such critical questions as how specifically
history and purpose are to be applied, and how a practice or statute
in reality establishes religion.
96. Il at 668 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy noted:
Even if Lynch did not control, I would not commit this court to the test applied by the
majority today. The notion that cases arising under the Establishment Clause should be
decided by an inquiry into whether a 'reasonable observer' may 'fairly understand'
government action to 'send a message to non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community,* is a recent, and in my view a most unwelcome,
addition to our tangled establishment jurisprudence.
Id.
97. Ia at 659 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part.) According to Justice
Kennedy:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to support
or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not in the guise of avoiding
hostility or callous indifference give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in
fact establishes a 'state religion or religious faith or tends to do so.'
Id (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). In Allegheny, the justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States extensively examined Establishment Clause principles in the holiday display context.
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655. Lemon and the evolving endorsement analysis were revisited by the
majority and Justice O'Connor in concurrence. Id at 592-94, 605-06, 609. See id at 623-37
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
98. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see infra notes 102-26 and accompanying text (summarizing
Kennedy's opinion, his reliance on coercion principles, and the concurring and dissenting justices'
response to a coercion analysis).
99. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 656-57 (Kennedy, I., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
According to Justice Kennedy:
The requirement of neutrality inherent in that [Lemon] formulation has sometimes been
stated in categorical terms . . . these statements must not give the impression of a
formalism that does not exist. Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language quoted
above would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between government and
religion. But that is not the history or purpose of the Establishment Clause. Government
policies of accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an accepted part
of our political and cultural heritage.
Id
100. Ad at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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II. WHAT STANDARD CONTROLS TODAY?
Although the question was placed squarely before the Supreme
Court in Lee v. Weisman,1°' the decision failed to resolve the issue
of the appropriate test to be applied in determining whether a practice
violated the Establishment Clause. Instead, the Court split 5-4 on the
outcome regarding the constitutionality of graduation prayers, while
the opinions evidence a discernible four, four, and one division
regarding the appropriate Establishment Clause standard. Justice
Kennedy, writing the opinion of the Court, framed the issue before
the Court as follows: "[W]hether including clerical members who
offer prayers as part of the official school graduation ceremony is
consistent with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment
,,102
Justice Kennedy essentially relied upon the school day prayer
cases 10 3 and his previously asserted coercion approach'0  in
determining whether a constitutional violation existed. "05 In
reaching the conclusion respondents Daniel Weisman and his
daughter, middle school graduate Deborah Weisman,1°  were the
victims of impermissible psychological coercion by the state, Justice
Kennedy held that, "at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in
religion or its exercise . .,,"07 According to Justice Kennedy such
101. See Petitioner's Opening Brief in Lee v. Weisman, at i (copy on file at Pacific Law
Journal). The Opening Brief states the questions before the Court as follows:
(1) Do school authorities violate the Establishment Clause by allowing a speaker at a
public junior high or high school graduation ceremony to offer an invocation and a
benediction that acknowledge a deity; (2) Whether direct or indirect government coercion
of religious conformity is a necessary element of an Establishment Clause violation?
Id.
102. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2652 (1992).
103. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text (discussing school day decisions).
104. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Kennedy's coercion
analysis).
105. See Lee, 112 S. CL 2649, 2658 (invoking a long line of cases dealing with religion,
primarily through some form of prayer, in schools).
106. ME at 2653-54. Both attended the graduation ceremony at issue in Lee after voicing their
objections to the school district's decision to include an invocation and benediction in the ceremony.
Ua
107. 1d at 2655.
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coercion exists when, as in Lee, school officials conduct a formal
religious observance at an important ceremonial event, such as a
prayer at a school graduation, thus creating an environment where
subtle coercive pressures exist and where the student has no real
alternative which would allow her to avoid either the fact or
appearance of participation in the religious component of the
graduation ceremony.0 8 Justice Kennedy noted:
[I1f common ground can be defined which permits once conflicting faiths
to express the shared conviction that there is an ethic and a morality which
transcends human invention, the sense of community and purpose sought
by all decent societies might be advanced. But though the First
Amendment does not allow the government to stifle prayers which aspire
to these ends, neither does it permit the government to undertake that task
for itself.109
The imprint of the state in composing prayers for students was
critical to Justice Kennedy's analysis, which warned that "a State
created orthodoxy would put at grave risk freedom of belief and
conscience" which Justice Kennedy views as the sole assurance that
religious faith is real, not imposed."'
Perhaps recognizing the absolutist extreme to which his opinion
might be taken, Justice Kennedy stated that at graduation time and
throughout the course of the educational process there would be
instances when religious values, religious practices, and religious
persons would interact with the public schools and students."' The
significance of this caveat is debatable. Justice Kennedy may be
simply referring to student/clergy contact through the Federal Equal
Access Act.112 On the other hand, the door may have been left open
108. Id. at 2656.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2658.
111. Id at 2661.
112. See Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,248 (1990) (upholding
the Federal Equal Access Act allowing student religious groups to meet and operate on campus in
specified circumstances); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1991) (setting forth the provisions of the
Federal Equal Access Act which allows religious clubs to meet on public school campuses in certain
specified circumstances). The curiosity is Justice Kennedy's inclusion of graduation time in the
categories within which religious values, religious practices and religious persons may permissibly
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for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to resuscitate student planned
and directed graduation invocations as in Jones v. Clear Creek
Independent School District, the graduation prayer case remanded by
the Court for determination in light of its decision in Lee. '13
In contrast, Justices Blackmun and Souter, writing separate
concurring opinions which were joined by Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, specifically rejected coercion as a necessary element of an
Establishment Clause violation. 114 Rather, to Justices Blackmun,
Souter, Stevens and O'Connor, a violation of the Establishment
Clause occurs "when public school officials, armed with the State's
authority, convey an endorsement of religion to their stu-
dents.... "1 Justice Souter also wrote to reject any "acknow-
ledgment or accommodation" approach in the Establishment Clause
area which allows "non-preferential" state promotion of religion over
non-religion," 6 determining the Establishment Clause forbids
support for religion in general no less than support for one religion or
another.
117
Finally, Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, vehemently rejected
Justice Kennedy's use of psychological coercion rather than legal
compulsion."'B Instead, the four dissenting justices would have
focused upon history, tradition, and the absence of legally (as
opposed to psychologically) imposed coercion to uphold the
graduation prayer practice at issue in Lee." 9
Thus, the continuing vitality of the tripartite Lemon analysis is
left unanswered by the Court's decision in Lee. 2 ° Justice Kennedy
declined the invitation by petitioner school district and the United
interact with public schools and students.
113. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 112 S. Q. 3020 (1992).
114. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2664 (Blackmun, J., concurring); iL at 2671 (Souter, J., concurring).
115. L at 2678 (Souter, J., concurring); see also id. at 2664-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 2668-70 (Souter, J., concurring).
117. IdL at 2670 (Souter, J., concurring).
118. l at 2681-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. I, at 2679, 2683-84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
120. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1970); see also supra notes 72-80 and
accompanying text (discussing the Lemon decision).
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States government to reconsider Lemon."' Instead of applying the
Lemon test, Justice Kennedy focused upon coercion principles to
determine that "religious exercise[s]" may not be conducted at a
graduation ceremony where "young graduates who object are induced
to conform." 122 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and
O'Connor, apparently also found insufficientjustification to formally
revisit Lemon. Justice Souter instead conducted a broad stare decisis
and historical analysis to essentially adopt the endorsement
analysis.123 Likewise, Justice Blackmun, also joined by Justices
Stevens and O'Connor, without discussing the vitality of Lemon as
precedent, relied solely upon an endorsement analysis as dispositive
in this case. 2 4 Based upon the mere lip service given to Lemon by
the majority of justices in Lee, Justice Scalia's dissent accurately
notes that the Court demonstrated "the irrelevance of Lemon by
essentially ignoring it."" 5 Justice Scalia goes on to note that "the
internment [of Lemon] may be the one happy byproduct of the
Court's otherwise lamentable decision." 126
Thus, with the tripartite analysis of Lemon left virtually
meaningless but not dead, the Lee Court provides the bench and bar
with more questions than answers regarding the proper standard to
apply when deciding or presenting an Establishment Clause question.
For example, does the practitioner argue, and the court apply, one or
all of the approaches set forth above, depending upon the facts of the
matter, or is the contest now reduced to competing endorsement and
coercion principles? Given the continuing flux, a deeper under-
standing of the underlying judicial assumptions operating in Lee and
in other Establishment Clause cases is required, both for the courts to
examine their own assumptions when deciding a case, and for a
practitioner in this area to effectively persuade a court to adopt a
desired resolution.
121. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655.
122. Id at 2661.
123. Id at 2678 (Souter, J. concurring).
124. Id at 2667 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125. Id at 2685 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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II. UNDERLYiNG DivERsrrY, COMMONALITY AND
TOLERANCE PRINCIPLES
It is critical to note that underneath all Establishment Clause tests,
as well as proposed revised and new tests as set forth above, lie
different judicial visions based upon principles of diversity,
commonality, and tolerance. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee
provides an excellent example of how focus upon one of these
visions to the exclusion of others creates a virtually outcome-
determinative Establishment Clause test. Specifically, Justice
Kennedy's opinion evidences a deep concern for the individual in a
religiously diverse society. It does not go too far to characterize
Justice Kennedy's opinion as focusing solely upon the individual,
emphasizing the duty of the state under the Establishment Clause to
protect such individual from coercive exposure to religion.
Likewise, Justice Scalia's primary focus on history and tradition,
invoking a theme of commonality that rises above our diverse
heritage, also foreshadows the outcome of his opinion that the
Establishment Clause should not be used as a tool to frustrate the
majority of Americans who wish to invoke God during community
celebrations. Examples of such references regarding diversity and
commonality principles abound in prior decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States 127 and, as illustrated below, were
particularly present and outcome-determinative in the lower court
graduation prayer cases.
A. Graduation Prayer Case Law
Turning first to an analysis of the reported pre-Lee graduation
prayer case law, two federal appellate courts, 12 four federal district
127. See infra notes 223-30 and accompanying text (discussing the use of these inchoate
principles in United States Supreme Court decisions).
128. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert granted and
judgment vacated, 112 S. CL 3020 (1992); Stein v. PlainwelU Community Sch., 822 F.2d 1406 (6th
Cit. 1987). In Stein, the court upheld graduation prayer in principle, but struck down the specific
prayers before it. Id at 1409-10.
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courts, 129 one state appellate court, 130 and one state supreme
court 131 upheld graduation prayer as constitutional, while one
federal appellate court, 132 three federal district courts,133 one state
supreme court134 and two state appellate courts1 35 struck gra-
duation prayer down as unconstitutional. Strictly by the numbers, an
almost even split between holdings of constitutionality and
unconstitutionality emerges. This split is not explained solely by
reference to the judicial test applied by the various courts-application
of at least two Lemon prongs by thirteen of the fifteen cases
referenced above resulted in a split of six (constitutional) 136 to
seven (unconstitutional).13
While this Article asserts that the technical judicial method of
applying one or more Lemon prongs may become critical, 138 most
129. Albright v. Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682 (D. Utah 1991); Stein
v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985), rev'd, 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir.
1987); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wood v. Mt. Lebanon Township
Sch. Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1293 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
130. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 45, 262 Cal. Rptr 452 (1989),
rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
131. Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Seb. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974).
132. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), aftd, 112 S. CL 2649 (1992).
133. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D. R.L 1990), aft'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990);
Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham v.
Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur, 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985).
134. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34
(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992).
135. Bennett v. Livermore Unified Soh. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 238 Cal. Rptr. 819
(1987); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986).
136. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992); Albright v. Board of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F.
Supp. 682 (D. Utah 1991); Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985),
rev'd, 522 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987); Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (ED. Va. 1974);
Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d 362 (Pa. 1974); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist.,
214 Cal. App. 3d 45,262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809,281 Cal. Rptr.
34 (1992).
137. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990), af'd, 112 S. CL 2649 (1992); Weisman
v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I 1990), aft'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990); Lundberg v. West
Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch.
Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809,281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 3026 (1992);
Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012,238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987); Kay v.
David Douglas Seh. Dist. No. 40,719 P.2d 875 (Or. App. 1986).
138. See Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992);
Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D. RI. 1990), af'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990); Sands v.
Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809,281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied,
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dispositive of the outcome in these fifteen cases was the deciding
courts' focus and emphasis on the organizing principles of diversity
and commonality. Taking again the thirteen courts applying the
Lemon analysis, a careful reading of these cases reveals that if the
court focused generally upon the diversity of America's population
and specifically upon the individual participant in the graduation
ceremony, as well as the potentially oppressive or coercive effect that
a prayer could have on any person who held agnostic, atheistic, or
simply non-prayer oriented beliefs, the court would strike down the
invocation or benediction." 9 Indeed, when one court striking down
an invocation considered the nation's common heritage, the court did
so in a fashion predisposed to minimizing the importance of that
commonality.1" This focus upon the individual often included a
concern with whether an individual felt welcome to attend the
ceremony. Concern was expressed that simply because a student was
not required to attend graduation in order to receive a diploma, the
invocation practice was not free from violating the Establishment
112 S. CL 3026 (1992) (decisions not applying the first secular purpose Lemon prong, focusing
instead mainly upon the second primary effects prong); see also infra notes 156-59 and
accompanying text (asserting that the way one or more of the Lemon prongs is applied may be
critical); Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 921, 809 P.2d at 846, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71 (Panelli, I., dissenting)
(stating "[u]nfortunately, it appears cases like this are decided not by applying a test but by choosing
which test to apply"). This Article refines Justice Panelli's insight by asserting that viewpoints on
diversity and commonality determine what approach to apply, and then secondarily impact the
judicial method of applying an approach or test.
139. See, e.g., Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1093, 1096 (1st Cir. 1990), aff'd, 112 S. CL
2649 (1992); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D. R.L 1990), aft'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (Ist Cir. 1990);
Lundberg v. West Monona Comm. Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331, 344-45 (N.D. Iowa 1989); Graham
v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Iowa 1985); Sands v. Morongo Unified
Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 883-84, 809 P.2d 809, 820-21, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 45-46 (1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992); Bennet v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012,
1023,238 Cal. Rptr. 819, 825 (1987); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40,719 P.2d 875, 880
(Or. App. 1986); id. at 882 (Warren, J., concurring).
140. See, e.g., Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 333 n.19. The Lundberg court, citing to the legislative
prayer case, Marsh v. Chambers, 1463 U.S. 783 (1983), noted that the Marsh court came close to
asserting that prayer in the legislative setting was, at best, a de minimis advancement of religion by
the state. Id. The Marsh Court held that opening the legislative session with prayer was a tolerable
acknowledgment of beliefs widely held by the people of this country. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
However, the Lundberg court noted that not only was this de minimis rationale not the basis for the
Marsh Court-s holding, it also failed to take into account the age of the participants involved in a
graduation prayer case-namely, children, who would be more susceptible to religious indoctrination.
Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 333 n.19.
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Clause. As stated in Justice Kennard's opinion in Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District:141
Such a result, in which nonbelievers and adherents of minority religions
would be effectively excluded from, or made to feel unwelcome at, an
important public school activity, would be contrary to the proper and
intended role of public schools in our society. 142
In contrast, one of the six courts upholding graduation school
prayer via a Lemon analysis specifically focused upon common
American history and traditions, and would require the individual to
tolerate "some governmental accommodation of religion."1 43
Another court focused upon broad commonality among human
beings and how "[t]he history of [humans] is inseparable from the
history of religion."1" The remaining four courts applying Lemon
focused upon context and the ceremonial aspect of graduations to
essentially strike a balance in favor of the common tradition and
history represented by an invocation or benediction, as opposed to
individual concerns. 145 Although not applying Lemon, one early
court decision upholding graduation prayer distinguished the school
day prayer decision, Engle v. Vitale, 46 focusing upon the secular
141. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denie4 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992).
142. Id. at 878,809 P.2d at 817,281 Cal. Rptr. at 42; see also Weirman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090,
1094 (1990) ("[t]he fact that individual students may absent themselves... furnishes no defense to
a claim of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause"); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No.
40, 719 P.2d 875, 880 (Or. App. 1986) ("school board's action in directing the superintendent and
principal of David Douglas High School to include the religious invocation required plaintiffs,
including the class valedictorian, as well as other students, to choose between attending the ceremony
or staying away"); Lundberg, 731 F. Supp. at 344 (Cthe voluntariness of attendance at the ceremony
does not decrease the concern that prayer at the ceremony might still appear to have the stamp of
school approval").
143. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416,421 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992).
144. Grossberg v. Deusebio, 380 F. Supp. 285 (R.D. Va. 1974).
145. Albright v. Board of Ed. of Granite Sch. Dist., 765 F. Supp. 682, 689, 691 (D. Utah,
1991); Stein v. Plainwell Community Sch., 610 F. Supp. 43 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Sands v. Morongo
Unified Sch. Dist., 214 Cal. App. 3d 45, 262 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d
809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991); Wiest v. Mt. Lebanon Sch. Dist., 320 A.2d. 362 (W.D. Pa. 1974).
146. 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Engle).
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nature of the activity and the students' voluntary participation in the
ceremony. 147
An excellent example of a decision struggling with and
interweaving the principles of diversity and commonality that so
marks this area of constitutional law is Stein v. Plainwell Community
Schools.14 In Stein, the Sixth Circuit did not apply the Lemon
analysis. Instead, the court applied the analysis of the United States
Supreme Court decision of Marsh v. Chambers49 to strike down as
unconstitutional the particular invocation at issue, while upholding
the practice in theory.'
To reach that decision, the Stein court first recognized the
diversity of the American people, and the value our nation places on
the principle of "equal liberty of conscience.""' The Stein court
focused upon consistent application of "equal liberty of conscience"
to both the legislative and school settings to uphold the practice of
offering invocations and benedictions at high school commencements
in theory. 2 Thus, the court recognized that "[l]iberty of conscience
is limited by the common interest in public order and security...
[and] individuals may be required to make some accommodation
with the 'history and tradition of this country,"'' 53 but, by the same
token, held such accommodation must not be allowed to rise to the
level of excluding certain members of society by allowing
invocations and benedictions that contain "language that says to some
parents and students: we do not recognize your religious beliefs, our
beliefs are superior to yours.""5 4 Because the language at issue in
147. Wood v. ML Lebanon Township Sch. Dist., 342 P. Supp. 1293, 1294 (W.D. Pa. 1972);
see Eagle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (barring prayer in public school).
148. 822 F.2d 1406 (6th Cir. 1987).
149. 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Marsh
decision).
150. Stein, 822 F.2d at 1410.
151. IkL at 1408-09. The phrase "equal liberty of conscience" appears to be the Stein court's
method of reconciling individual rights of conscience with the tradition and history represented by
the legislative invocation approved in Marsh.
152. lt at 1409.
153. Id at 1408 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797).
154. Id at 1410.
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Stein did exactly this, the Stein court concluded the particular
invocation was unconstitutional.'55
This judicial struggle with principles of diversity, focusing upon
common heritage and community traditions, is by no means limited
to graduation prayer cases. Principles based upon diversity and
commonality in our pluralistic American society, although inchoate,
have often been discussed, or cited extensively if not formally
discussed, in Supreme Court Establishment Clause opinions.' 6
Indeed, the Lee decision illustrates quite distinctly that these
155. I. The Stein court objected to the prayers in question because:
[The invocations/benedictions] are framed and phrased so that they 'symbolically place
the government's seal of approval on one religious view'-the Christian view. They
employ the language of Christian theology and prayer. Some expressly invoke the name
of Jesus as the Savior. They are not the 'civil' invocations or benedictions used in public
legislative and judicial sessions as described in Marsh.
ICE
156. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 589-591
(1989) (stating "[p]recisely because of the religious diversity that is our national heritage, the
Founders added to the Constitution a Bill of Rights.. ."); id. at 613, 619; id. at 627-28 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (stating "[w]e live in a pluralistic society. Our citizens come from diverse religious
traditions or adhere to no particular religious beliefs at all"); id. at 679 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating "[iln my view, the principles of the Establishment Clause and our
Nation's historic traditions of diversity and pluralism allow communities to make reasonable
judgments respecting the accommodation or acknowledgment of holidays with both cultural and
religious respects"); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987); id. at 615 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating "[w]e have implied that voluntary governmental accommodation of religion is not
only permissible but desirable"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,53-54 (1985). In Wallace, the Court
stated:
This conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's
freedom of conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of
respect are the product of free and voluntary choice by the faithful, and from the
recognition of the political interest in forestalling intolerance extends beyond intolerance
among Christian sects-or even intolerance among religions-to encompass intolerance
of the disbeliever and the uncertain.
Id.; see id. at 69-79, 80-81 (O'Connor J., concurring); id. at 89-90 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Ed. at
113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673, 678 (1984); id. at 697
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
791 (1983) (asserting history supports "the subject [of legislative prayer] was considered carefully
and the action not taken thoughtlessly by force of any tradition and without regard to the problems
posed by a pluralistic society); id. at 803-06, 812, 817 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602,658 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203,
241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating "[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our democracy and
the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny"); id. at 236-37 (Jackson, J.,
concurring); id. at 238-39, 243 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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seemingly inchoate principles are now rising up to carry the day.'57
Therefore, a greater understanding and recognition of these
organizing principles15 of diversity and commonality are necessary
for counsel who plan to tread Establishment Clause waters. As set
forth below, the California Supreme Court's decision in Sands v.
Morongo School District'59 well illustrates how these organizing
principles-a focus upon our nation's religious diversity and the
discrete individual versus a contrary focus upon the nation's common
history and heritage-impact both the judicial approach taken and the
method of applying such an approach.
B. The Sands Decision
1. The Test Applied
In Sands v. Morongo School District, "6 six justices of the
Supreme Court of California crafted analytic opinions of length and
breadth regarding the constitutionality of traditional invocations and
benedictions at public high school graduation ceremonies. 161 On the
issue of federal constitutionality, the opinions discussed either
different prongs of the Lemon test, or different alternative tests
altogether. The opinions also extensively analyzed, and differed on,
basic principles and values of the First Amendment. 62
157. See supra notes 102-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Lee decision).
158. The author refers to these principles as 'organizing" principles in the sense that they are
arranged by courts into a "whole of interdependent parts." WEBSTeR'S NITm NEw COLLEoIATE
DICrioNARY 831 (9th ed. 1983).
159. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992).
160. Id
161. Id at 867-84, 809 P.2d at 810-21, 291 Cal. Rptr. at 35-46 (Kennard, J., delivering lead
opinion); id at 884-905, 809 P.2d at 821-35, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46-60 (Lucas, CJ., concurring); hi
at 905-14,809 P.2d at 835-42,281 Cal. Rptr. at 60-67 (Mosk, L, concurring); id. at 914-18, 809 P.2d
at 842-44, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69 (Arabian, L, concurring); id at 918-39, 809 P.2d at 844-59, 281
Cal. Rptr. at 69-84 (Panelli, J., dissenting); id. at 939-47, 809 P.2d at 859-64, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84-89
(Baxter, L, dissenting).
162. Associate Justices Mosk and Panelli also thoroughly analyzed pertinent state and
constitutional history and precedent to reach conflicting conclusions. See Sands, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 905-
14, 809 P. 2d 809, 835-42, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 60-67 (Mosk, ., concurring); id at 918-39, 809 P.2d
at 844-59,281 Cal. Rptr. at 69-84 (Panelli, L, dissenting). It is clear a majority of the court did not
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The Sands plurality flatly held the challenged practice of allowing
secondary students to include a religious invocation and benediction
in graduation ceremonies unconstitutional based upon both the
primary effect and entanglement prongs of Lemon. 13 On the other
hand, Associate Justice Panelli in dissent extensively analyzed the
Lemon test,' 64 as well as precedent regarding history and per-
missible accommodation of religious beliefs in public life65 to find
no federal violation." Also in dissent, Associate Justice Baxter
applied the Lemon test"6 7 and concluded that the majority of
justices went too far in relying on Lemon to ban the inclusion of any
religious prayer in a high school graduation ceremony.'68
The concurrences of Chief Justice Lucas and Associate Justice
Arabian were thus determinative. Associate Justice Arabian
pertinently reasoned that the prayers in Sands were Judeo-Christian
in nature and that this emphasis would likely offend or seem to be an
endorsement of religion to persons who did not share those beliefs,
thus violating the effect prong of Lemon. 6 9 However, Justice
Arabian also believed that the spirit of religious freedom contained
in the Constitution and our common history supported the prayers at
render any holding on independent state grounds, so discussion of state issues is left for future State
Establishment Clause cases.
163. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872-81, 809 P. 2d at 812-19, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 37-44. The plurality
stated: "Thus, the Lemon test has remained controlling law for twenty years. We are required to
decide federal constitutional cases on the law as it presently exists. Accordingly, we apply the Lemon
test in this case." Id. at 872, 809 P.2d at 811-12, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38; see also id. at 872 n.3, 809
P.2d 813 n.3, 281 Cal. Rptr. 38 n.3. Due to the four-four-one split in Lee, this conclusion regarding
Lemon is outdated and leaves California Establishment Clause jurisprudence extremely muddled.
164. Id. at 925-31, 809 P.2d at 849-53, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74-73 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 921-25, 809 P.2d at 846-49, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 71-74 (Panelli, I., dissenting).
166. Id. at 931, 809 P.2d at 849, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 78 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 940, 809 P.2d at 859-60, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 944, 809 P.2d at 862, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 87 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 916, 809 P.2d at 843,281 Cal. Rptr. at 68 (Arabian, J., concurring). Justice Arabian
stated:
[I]t is undeniable that the prayers at issue do reflect mainstream Judeo-Christian beliefs.
Accordingly, those who shun public prayer, others who reject the concept of a patriarchal
'Lord' or 'Father,' and still others who adhere to non-Western religions, or no religion at
all, may view such publicly sanctioned prayers as offensive, if not indeed an official
endorsement of religion. Thus viewed, the prayers in question could not pass muster under
the second prong of the United States Supreme Court's Lemon test.
Id,
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issue and, therefore, though constrained to concur in the holding of
Justice Kennard's opinion, Justice Arabian did not endorse the
underlying reasoning and analysis.170 Justice Arabian thereafter
concluded:
Our national experience teaches that the mutual independence of church
and state is the most conducive system to religious freedom and social and
political tranquility. Public prayer does not threaten that harmony or the
liberty of conscience which underlies it. On the contrary, it is through such
occasions that we reinforce and celebrate the rich diversity that has made
us a great and noble people.
171
California Chief Justice Lucas also reluctantly concurred in
Justice Kennard's holding, basing his conclusion upon the fact that
the prayer used by the Morongo Unified School District violated the
effect prong of Lemon because the prayers in question advanced
religion. 72 Chief Justice Lucas thereafter fully and thoughtfully
reviewed key principles underlying the religion clauses, 1
73
evaluated the facts and considered the context (i.e., that the prayer
was recited as part of a long-standing practice at a graduation
ceremony),174 and applied principles such as those set forth in
Marsh and County ofAllegheny to decide:
Like a scientific theory, a legal principle or fact must account for all the
data, i.e., both church-state disengagement and benign recognition of
religion and religious ideas in American constitutional law and civic
170. Id.
171. I1& at 918, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (Arabian, J., concurring).
172. IdX at 884-85, 809 P.2d at 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46 (Lucas, CJ., concurring). The Chief
Justice stated:
Reluctantly, I concur in the judgment On issues of federal constitutional law, this court
is bound under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution by applicable
decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Based on my reading of the relevant
Supreme Court authority, I conclude that the Morongo Unified School District's practice
of allowing invited members of the clergy and others to offer prayers at high school
graduation ceremonies violates the second prong of the high court's Lemon test, i.e., the
primary effect of the practice is one that advanes ... religion.
ICL
173. Id. at 886-93, 809 P.2d at 822-27, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 47-52 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
174. Id. at 893-901,809 P.2d at 827-33,281 Cal. Rptr. at 52-58 (Lucas, CJ., concurring); see
infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text (further discussing the importance of context).
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culture. When government engages in a practice that is similar to those
benign acknowledgements of a Supreme Being endorsed by the framers
of the Constitution and that has stood the test of time by remaining an
accepted part of culture, such practice should be upheld as constitutional
unless it engages government in sectarian favoritism, financial aid to
church institutions, or other conduct that pressures citizens, directly or
indirectly, to believe or disbelieve. Having found none of the latter
elements to be present in this case, I would, if free to do so, uphold the
challenged practice of the school district.
175
Thus, while the majority of the Supreme Court of California
perceived its result in Sands as dictated by the High Court's Lemon
precedent and the Supremacy Clause, the holding in Sands was more
narrowly based upon the concurring views of Justice Arabian and
Chief Justice Lucas regarding uncited precedent specifically
involving the second primary effect prong of the Lemon test. Both
Chief Justice Lucas and Associate Justice Arabian, free from the
constraints of Lemon, would have upheld the traditional practice.
Thus, even among a court majority ostensibly applying Lemon, and
particularly the second primary effect prong, significant distinctions
in approach and method are discernable. Further analysis illustrates
key differences among the court majority and dissenters in Sands,
and demonstrates the importance of the organizing principle chosen
by each justice.
2. The Sands Plurality
Justice Powell noted in Wallace v. Jaffree176 that one value of
the Lemon test in the past had been avoidance of ad hoc decision
making.177 However, the above analysis of the splits of opinion
among the California Supreme Court in graduation prayer case law
establishes, at a minimum, that ad hoc decision-making continues
175. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 901, 809 P.2d at 833,281 Cal. Rptr. at 58 (Lucas, CJ., concurring);
see Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
176. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
177. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63.
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unabated. 178 Justice Kennard's Sands opinion concretely demon-
strates that such ad hoe judicial choices continue by a court assertedly
applying Lemon. These judicial choices change based upon which
approach is adopted,179 and perhaps more specifically in the Sands
plurality opinion, which prong of the Lemon test is emphasized in
given circumstances.
The Sands opinion illustrates that the primary, outcome-
determinative judicial choice is whether the court adopts the
organizing principles of diversity or commonality." 0 The
importance the Sands plurality opinion placed, in both opening and
closing the opinion with tributes to the diversity of America cannot
be slighted or dismissed.' 8' The underlying policy driving the
Sands plurality opinion eloquently rests upon diversity and pluralism,
commencing with the statement that "[o]urs is a nation composed of
people of many races and faiths." 18 2 The opinion concludes by
observing:
In a world frequently torn by religious factualism and the violence
tragically associated with political division along religious lines, our
nation's position of governmental neutrality on religious matters stands as
an illuminating example of the true meaning of freedom and
tolerance.
183
178. See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text (graduation prayer case law analysis).
179. See supra notes 38-100 and accompanying text (setting forth the various approaches used
to analyze Establishment Clause cases).
180. This point is borne out by much of the emphasis in oral argument before the California
Supreme Court. Counsel for Appellants (A.C.L.U.-Sands) told the court a story involving a Native-
American student who had faced disciplinary action in a district somewhere in California due to her
refusal to stand or recite the Pledge of Allegiance; a point having nothing to do with graduation
ceremonies in Morongo Unified, but everything to do with ethnic and religious diversity and a focus,
upon the individual. The author focused to a great extent upon the history and ceremonial nature of
the practice in dispute, prompting Justice Mosk to remark at one point that Thomas Jefferson "must
be whirling in his grave." Justice Kennard asked the author whether a Japanese-American high school
principal selecting a Buddhist monk to deliver an invocation at his school for sixteen years would
not establish a preference for a religion. Chief Justice Lucas, Justice Arabian, and Justice Panelli
dxtensively questioned both counsel regarding similar historical practices and acknowledgments of
the religious heritage, including the reference to "Almighty God" in the preamble to the California
Constitution.
181. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 867-68, 883-84, 809 P.2d at 810, 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35, 46.
182. Id. at 867, 809 P.2d at 810, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
183. Id. at 884, 809 P.2d at 821, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
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The Sands plurality opinion's primary focus upon individual religious
sensibilities is apparent:
Through the practices challenged in this case, the government appears to
prefer religion over nonreligion; appears to prefer religions that
acknowledge the practice of petitionary prayer over religions that do not
recognize such prayer, appears to prefer the religious belief that prayer
should be public over the belief that prayer should be private; and
implicitly endorses religions that address a single, anthropomorphic, and
male deity over those that do not.18 4
The plurality's emphasis upon national religious diversity and
sensitivity to each religion's tenets regarding a deity, as well as each
individual's own personal religious or non-religious conceptions, is
certainly far different than Justice Douglas' previous dismissal of a
standard based upon the perception of the "fastidious atheist or
agnostic."185 The clear policy focus and consequent emphasis upon
individual sensibilities significantly impacted the method of applying
the Lemon inquiry undertaken by the Sands plurality.
First, and perhaps most notably, Justice Kennard's opinion
declined to apply the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.
186
The Sands plurality simply noted that although it had doubts whether
the government sponsored prayers at issue here would pass the
secular purpose test, the court would not address that question
because the Lemon primary effect and entanglement prong were
violated."8 7 However, by refusing to address the first prong of
Lemon, the Sands plurality ignored two important and carefully
drafted California Court of Appeal secular purpose findings.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal had initially determined that
the purpose of the graduation ceremony itself was "wholly
secular."188 The court of appeal then examined the invocation and
benediction opening and closing the graduation ceremony in the
184. Id at 874, 809 P.2d at 814, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
185. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952).
186. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 872, 809 P.2d at 813, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
187. Id,
188. Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1385, 1397, 262 Cal. Rptr. 452, 459
(1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
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context of that secular purpose.189 The appellate court concluded
that the challenged practice in context served the legitimate secular
purpose of solemnizing the public occasion and added a note of
dignity and decorum to the ceremony by serving to focus the
audience's attention."9 The court of appeal thereafter analytically
applied the second primary effect Lemon prong and determined that
although standing alone, prayer may appear to have the purpose or
effect of advancing religion, in the context of the graduation
ceremony, where it was a brief and peripheral part of a ceremonial
function, the practice was constitutional.19'
Since Justice Kennard's opinion in Sands simply did not address
the secular purpose prong of Lemon, the opinion avoided
consideration of the long-standing history and ubiquity of the
graduation practice, and averted analyzing such invocations and
benedictions in their unique circumstances. Thus, any approach
involving considerations of context and history are left out of the
California Supreme Court plurality's analysis of the Lemon test."9
Additionally, the Sands plurality ruled as a matter of law, a
standard appellate courts must apply in Establishment Clause
cases.' 9 Although recognizing that the record lacked evidence of
any student or other participant in a graduation ceremony actually
objecting to invocations and benedictions, the Sands plurality opinion
concluded, as a matter of law, that "a reasonable observer would
view the inclusion of graduation prayers in an official school
189. Id,
190. Id,
191. Id, at 1397-99, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 459-61. The court noted that the prayer did not occur in
a pedagogical context, nor was it part of a program of calculated indoctrination. Id,
192. Justice Panelli in dissent critiqued this omission writing:
The lead opinion does not discuss secular purpose, the Lemon test's first prong. While I
understand the opinion's statement that a challenged practice violates the Lemon test if
it fails any of the three prongs, I question the wisdom of forbidding a practice that is
deeply embedded in tradition without stopping to consider its purpose. To do so may
suggest an insensitivity to widely held beliefs that the majority probably does not intend.
Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 926, 809 P.2d at 849, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (Panelli, J., dissenting).
193. Id at 874 n.5, 809 P.2d at 814 n.5, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39 n.5; see County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573,597-602 (1989) (Supreme Court of the United State's
decision holding, as a matter of law, that the government had given support to a particular religious
message by its display of a creche on the grand staircase in the county courthouse); see also supra
notes 58-64 and accompanying text (discussing County of AUegheny).
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ceremony as signifying approval of the practice of prayer and the
prayer's religious content. The message of sponsorship is
unavoidable." 94
The Sands plurality opinion ruled as a matter of law regarding the
primary effect upon a hypothetical reasonable observer yet, as noted,
did not address the secular celebratory purpose which impacts any
effect upon a genuine reasonable observer during a ceremony. The
court's non-contextual approach is an unmistakable result of an
emphasis upon diversity. If one assumes it is constitutionally
impermissible for any single individual to attend or, put bluntly,
undergo a public ceremony in which clergy improperly invoke solely
a "single, anthropomorphic, and male deity,"1 95 then the ceremonial
context, history and ubiquity of the practice is of little import. A
court may safely assume a reasonable observer would of course
object regardless of context. Indeed, the long-standing ceremonial
inclusion of the invocation and benediction within the graduation
ceremony mattered even less if a court considered the school day
cases196 controlling, rather than the facts regarding actual
graduation ceremonies. The ceremonial context is then simply
irrelevant.
As another predictable result of the court's chosen emphasis upon
diversity and the individual, the Sands plurality shifted to analogizing
the end of the year graduation ceremony situation to the instructional
school day.'97 The plurality's use of this analogy assists in
understanding the underlying dynamic, since an analogy to the school
day can be made only by ignoring context, as is made clear by brief
application of both the purpose and effect prongs of Lemon.
First, with respect to the school day, the overall state secular
purpose is instruction of pupils. Assuming momentarily no opinion
194. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 874 n.5, 809 P.2d at 814 n.5, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39 n.5.
195. Id at 874, 809 P.2d at 814, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
196. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (discussing the school-day cases).
197. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 876,809 P.2d at 816,281 Cal. Rptr. at 41. Thus, the plurality stated:
Moreover under the district's logic, prayers at the beginning of the school day would be
constitutionally unobjectionable solely because they would be part of an education
experience that is predominantly nonreligious. Yet prayers at the beginning of the school
day have long been unconstitutional.
Id
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on point from the United States Supreme Court, what would be the
asserted secular purpose of prayers, invocations, or benedictions
during the school day? If such a secular purpose were claimed, to
have credibility it would need to be asserted in the context of the
overall instructional purpose. As a result, purported secular purposes
of religious material or activity in schools have actually included
assertions of proper instruction such as in Stone v. Graham,19
8
where the state argued the posting of the Ten Commandments met
the secular purpose of instruction regarding a "fundamental legal
code."' 99 The Supreme Court has disapproved certain challenged
statutes or practices based on their purported secular purpose, and has
held that the effect of combining instruction and religious practice is
an impermissible advancement of religion."0 If, as in Wallace v.
Jaffree,20' the High Court finds there is no genuine asserted
instructional secular purpose, e.g., the real purpose is to return prayer
to the school day, the majority of justices on the United States
Supreme Court would hold and have so held the secular purpose
prong violated.2°
Problems arise when the reviewing court both ignores context and
fails to apply the secular purpose Lemon prong. For example, in
contrast to the Sands plurality, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
the lower court Sands opinion essentially held that a genuine
congruency existed between the secular celebratory purpose (e.g.,
pomp and circumstance) and the secular solemnizing effect of
traditional invocation and benedictions at graduation ceremonies. °3
Thus, historical and ubiquitous invocations or benedictions in the
198. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
199. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,589-90 (1987); id, at 592
(concluding the secular purpose was to change the science curriculum of public schools); Abington
Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (stating the secular purpose was the "promotion of
moral values, in contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the perpetuation of our
institutions, and the teaching of literature").
200. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 39 (statutory posting ofTen Commandments); Edwards, 482 U.S.
at 590 (statutory teaching of creationism science); Abington, 374 U.S. at 203 (practice of daily
prayer).
201. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
202. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56-57 (involving statutory moment of meditation).
203. See Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 1385, 1397,262 Cal. Rptr. 452,459
(1989), rev'd, 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991).
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context of the graduation ceremony did not have the primary effect
of advancing or endorsing religion to a reasonable observer. This
ceremonial congruency between purpose and effect does not logically
carry over to the instructional day.
While it could cogently be argued that the school day prayer
cases should have been controlling in Sands since stare decisis was
the primary ground for Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lee v.
Weisman,204 or that the return of prayer to the school day was at
least a theoretical possibility requiring consideration by a court facing
such a case, such arguments fail to address the larger issues clearly
present in Establishment Clause disputes. Given the splits in pre-Lee
graduation prayer case law, 5 in which judges faced arguments that
the school day prayer cases were dispositive, it remains clear that an
individual judge's perceptions regarding the organizing principles of
either diversity or commonality became determinative in deciding
what Establishment Clause approach to utilize and, in turn,
determined the outcome of the case.2"6 The Sands plurality's
approach and its resulting method of applying the Lemon prongs,
particularly deciding to emphasize the effect prong and declining to
analyze context and history, became virtually outcome-
determinative.0 7
3. The Swing Concurring Opinions in Sands
When considering the same arguments as the Sands plurality, four
of the state supreme court justices chose alternative approaches, with
204. 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2657-61 (1992).
205. See supra notes 128-47 and accompanying text (discussing these splits).
206. See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text (discussing pre-Lee graduation prayer
cases).
207. Again, both the California Supreme Court's plurality decision in Sands and the trial and
appellate courts in Lee focused almost exclusively upon the second Lemon prong. See Sands v.
Morongo Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863,872-79,809 P.2d 809,813-17,281 Cal. Rptr. 34,38-42 (1991);
Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090, 1094-95 (Ist Cir. 1990), aftid, 112 S. C. 2649 (1992); Weisman
v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 71-73 (D.C.R.I. 1990), aff'd 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990).
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differing results. 08 Chief Justice Lucas' and Justice Arabian's
concurring opinions are of primary importance to this analysis since
both explicitly reflect the on-going debate between a strict
application of the primary effect Lemon prong and, alternatively, an
emphasis upon the common American heritage present throughout
the nation's history.209 Both justices joined the holding based solely
upon the primary effect Lemon prong, but rejected Justice Kennard's
approach. 210 Each opinion honors the individual, but also looks
towards recognizing the worth of the individual within the larger
community in which she or he lives.
211
As did Justice Kennard, Justice Arabian concludes his concurring
opinion with a discussion of the organizing principle of diversity, but
presents a far different view of diversity than that of the Sands
plurality-a diversity grounded in the complementary principle of
human commonality.1 2 Justice Arabian cites Presidents Lincoln
and Washington as among those who "innately understood that the
American spirit does not simply 'tolerate' religious, racial, or cultural
differences: it takes pride in them. They are our source of strength
and hope for the future." 21  In this viewpoint, tolerance is
concerned with recognizing genuine human commonality, while still
validating the discrete conscience of each individual. For example,
President-elect Abraham Lincoln's February 11, 1861 "Farewell
208. The dissents of Justice Panelli and Justice Baxter also reflect different visions from the
Sands plurality. Justice Panelli's opinion in particular should not be overlooked as he extensively
analyzed precedent in the area of acknowledgment of religion and our common history, historical
principles in Marsh, as well as a sensitive Lemon inquiry, to uphold the practice. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d
at 918-39, 809 P.2d at 844-59, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69-84 (Paneli, J., dissenting). Justice Baxter applied
a complete Lemon inquiry, and would have provided guidance to remedy what he believed to be
suspect practices. Il at 939-47, 809 P.2d at 859-64, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 84-89 (Baxter, L, dissenting).
Both opinions are well worth reviewing for in-depth alternative approaches to that taken by the Sands
plurality, but in the interests of conciseness,- these decisions are not extensively analyzed here. See
Michaelle DiGrazia, Note, Sands v. Morongo Un ied School District: Graduates, Will We Stand and
Join in Prayer?, 23 PAc. Li. 1449 (1992) (providing a full case analysis of Sands).
209. See Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 884-905, 809 P.2d at 821-35, 281 Cal. Rplr. at 46-60 (Lucas,
CJ., concurring); id. at 914-18, 809 P.2d at 842-44,281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69 (Arabian, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 884-905, 809 P.2d at 821-35, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 46-60 (Lucas, CJ., concurring); id.
at 914-18, 809 P.2d at 842-44, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69 (Arabian, 3., concurring).
211. See id. at 890-93, 809 P.2d at 825-27, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 50-52 (1991) (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring); id, at 915-18, 809 P.2d at 842-34, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-69 (Arabian, 3., concurring).
212. See id. at 915-16, 809 P.2d at 842-43,281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68 (Arabian, ., concurring).
213. Id. at 918, 809 P.2d at 844, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 69 (Arabian, J., concurring).
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Address at Springfield" perhaps best demonstrates the ideal of
commonality cited by Justice Arabian:
My friends-No one, not in my situation, can appreciate my feeling of
sadness at this parting. To this place, and the kindness of these people, I
owe every thing. Here I have lived a quarter of a century, and have passed
from a young to an old man. Here my children have been born, and one
is buried. I now leave, not knowing when, or whether ever, I may return,
with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington.
Without the assistance of that Divine Being, who ever attended him, I
cannot succeed. With that assistance I cannot fail. Trusting in Him, who
can go with me, and remain with you and be every where for good, let us
confidently hope that all-will yet be well. To His care commending you,
as I hope in your prayers you will commend me, I bid you an affectionate
farewell.2 14
Earlier presidents, including Washington, Jefferson, and Madison
invoked a Supreme Being when addressing Congress or the
American people.215 This ideal is presently also expressed daily in
California classrooms when pupils recite or listen to the Pledge of
Allegiance, particularly the concluding phrase "and to the Republic
for which it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty
and justice for all."
In the viewpoints expressed by Chief Justice Lucas and Justice
Arabian, a sense of community is one result of positive expressions
of our commonality as human beings. As understood by California
Chief Justice Lucas in his concurring opinion, public invocations and
benedictions provide a sense of tradition, continuity, and
transcendence that evokes positive emotions and expectations. These
elements, in turn, serve to unify the community and provide a
214. LARRY SHAPIRo, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, MYsTIc CHORDS OF MEMORY, A SELECTION OF
LINCOLN'S WRiNGs 37 (1984).
215. See, e.g. U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1789 TO GEORGE Buss, 1989, 1-2 (Bicentennial
ed. 1989) (George Washington, First Inaugural Address, April 30, 1789); id at 13, 15, 17 (Ihomas
Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, March 4,1801); id. at 22-23 Cfliomss Jefferson, Second Inaugural
Address, March 4, 1805); d. at 28 (James Madison, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1809).
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foundation for moral and ethical standards."216 Chief Justice Lucas
recognized that "without some sharing of these kinds of ideas and
sentiments, a community is not a community."217
The Chief Justice's thorough opinion in Sands recognized and
solidified the two underlying principles in Establishment Clause case
law: (1) Church and state disengagement; 21 8 and (2) benign
recognition of religion as part of American culture.219 Thereafter,
the Chief Justice evaluated the challenged invocation and benediction
within traditional graduation ceremonies,' ° and would have upheld
the practice under endorsement principles, the Marsh principles, '
or a sensitive Lemon inquiry.2  The Chief Justice's approach seeks
to continue to bar genuine establishments of religion, and practices
whiich tend to do so, while allowing accommodation of the nation's
deep religious heritage through benign acknowledgements of that
history in public ceremony and ritual. How such an approach would
work in practice must be left to future cases which reach the state
supreme court.
IV. DIVERSrrY AND CoMMONATY:
REcoGNmNG AND QUESTIONING KEY ASSUMPmoNs
This Article has established, through analysis of graduation
prayer case-law in general 223 and key opinions from Sands v.
Morongo School District224 in particular, that bench and bar
assumptions regarding the organizing principles of diversity and
commonality affect judicial decision-making in Establishment Clause
216. Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863,894,809 P.2d 809,827-28,281 Cal.
Rptr. 34, 52-53 (1991) (Lucas, C., concurring).
217. Id at 896, 809 P.2d at 829, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (Lucas, C., concurring).
218. Id. at 887-90, 809 P.2d at 823-25, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 48-50 (Lucas, CJ., concurring).
219. Id. at 890-93, 809 P.2d at 825-27, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 50-52 (Lucas, C.J., concurring).
220. Id. at 893-901, 905, 809 P.2d at 827-33, 835, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 52-58, 60 (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring).
221. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (discussing the Marsh decision).
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 128-59 and accompanying text (discussing graduation prayer case law).
224. 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026
(1992); see supra notes 160-222 and accompanying text (discussing relevant portions of the Sands
decision).
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cases.225 The United States Supreme Court decision in Lee v.
Weisman,226 as well as references in previous High Court
opinions,227 fully support this analysis. Any absolutist approach
resting upon one vision of religious diversity and resulting in a focus
entirely upon perceptions of the discrete individual will ultimately
result in holding the challenged practice or statute unconstitutional,
as evidenced by the Sands plurality opinion.22 In contrast,
practices or statutes analyzed under an approach supporting
acknowledgement of our nation's religious heritage and focusing
upon history rest largely upon a vision of the nation's common
heritage and basic human commonality, and will tend to be upheld as
constitutional. While the emerging and competing endorsement and
coercion approaches22 struggle to reconcile the Lemon precedent
with the rights of individual conscience and the appropriate
recognition of the history and ubiquity of challenged religious
practices in our community civic life, neither approach had the firm
support of a majority of justices in Lee.23 Indeed, deep judicial
concerns regarding recognition of individual rights and the
conflicting accommodation of historical community traditions are left
unanswered in Lee.
Thus, recognition of these core principles, as sought by California
Chief Justice Lucas in Sands,231 is clearly needed but not yet in
sight. Such a synthesis would prohibit attempts to establish a State
religion violative of individual conscience, but would permit benign
ceremonial acknowledgements of the nation's religious heritage.
However, to reach this much needed point of certainty in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the bench and bar must be
225. See supra notes 128-222 and accompanying text.
226. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992).
227. See supra notes 38-100 and accompanying text (setting forth relevant United States
Supreme Court decisions).
228. See supra notes 178-207 and accompanying text (discussing the Sands plurality decision).
229. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text (discussing the endorsement and coercion
approaches).
230. See supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Lee decision).
231. See Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 901,809 P.2d 809,833,281 Cal. Rptr.
34, 58 (1991) (Lucas, CJ., concurring) (stating [l]ike a scientific theory, a legal principle or fact
must account for all the data, i.e., both church-state disengagement and benign recognition ofreligion
and religious ideas in American constitutional law and civil culture") (emphasis added).
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willing to both recognize and question key assumptions, while
remaining open to fresh thinking. 2
A. Definition Versus Context
One such key assumption concerns the religious nature of the
speech, display, or practice in dispute and the always-easy
determination, usually based upon a dictionary definition of the
religious practice or activity, that the primary purpose or effect of the
practice must inherently be religious.23 The United States Supreme
Court rejected this method in Lynch v. Donnelly,234 wherein it
noted that to "focus exclusively on the religious component of any
activity could lead to [the activity's] invalidation under the
Establishment Clause." 3 5 Nevertheless, the absolutist approach set
forth in Part I above lends itself easily to this method of argument,
and will continue to do so if courts focus solely upon a discrete
individual activity and do not analyze the challenged practice in its
"unique circumstances, " 236 e.g., context.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Lee v. Weisman
illustrates this application of a definition, stating: "There can be 'no
doubt' that the invocation of God's blessings delivered at Northern
Bishop Middle School is 'a religious activity." 237 Justice
232. Counsel must be ready to address such assumptions as apply in presenting a particular
case.
233. See, e.g., Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 193 Cal. App. 3d 1012, 1020,238 Cal.
Rptr. 819, 823-24 (1987); Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981), affd 455 U.S. 913
(1982). The author has experienced this argument first hand. The A.C.L.U., appellants before the state
supreme court in Sands, asserted that as a matter of law, it was without question that the primary
purpose of a religious invocation was religious. Petitioner's Opening Brief to the California Supreme
Court, Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, at 9-10 (copy on file at Pacific Law Journal. The
A.C.L.U. also asserted that by definition, prayer is not a secular practice. I. at 10-11.
234. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
235. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
236. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 392 U.S. 573,591-92
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (discussing the
absolutist approach).
237. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. CL 2649, 2664 (1992) (Blackmun, J. concurring). Justice
Blackmun also notes:
In this case, the religious message it promotes is specifically Judeo-Christian. The phrase
in the benediction: "We must each strive to fulfill what you require of us all, to do justly,
to love mercy, to walk humbly" obviously was taken from the Book of the Prophet
Pacific Law Journal IVol. 24
Blackmun continues on to quickly determine "there can be no doubt
that the government is advancing and promoting religion." 
8
A contextual analysis is broader than simply referencing a
definition. Prayer may easily be conceded to be a core component of
religion.2 39 However, verbal or silent prayer in a synagogue,
church, or mosque during a religious service held among adherents
to a particular belief is far different from a non-sectarian, non-
denominational inspirational invocation or benediction delivered
during a public ceremony. Perhaps the best contextual judicial
description of a civic invocation is that previously set forth by Justice
Blackmun in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union:
[L]egislative prayer (like the invocation that commences each session of
this Court) is a form of acknowledgment of religion that 'serve[s], in the
only wa[y] reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular
purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the
future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation
in society.' The function and history of this form of ceremonial deism
suggest that 'those practices are not understood as conveying government
approval of particular religious beliefs.' 2 °
Recognition of the unique role that civic invocations play in our
culture precisely differentiates the purpose and effect of prayer in a
civic ceremony from prayer in an unabashed religious activity.
However, since Justice Blackmun focused simply upon a definition
in Lee, he thereby cut himself off from the richer contextual
discussion of invocations and benedictions he previously engaged in,
as exemplified by the above-quoted language from his opinion in
County ofAllegheny.
A more encompassing contextual analysis is not limited to cases
involving prayer. It can also be argued that a Christian cross has a
Micah, ch. 6, v. 8.
Id. at 2664 n.5 (Blacknun, J. concurring). In this view, any "Judeo-s" inspired message is
per se religious.
238. Ild. at 2664 (Blackmun, I., concurring).
239. WuJAm JAMES, Tim VARErS oF REuoious ExPERiEN cE 415-28 (1990).
240. County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 491 n.46 (incorporating Justice O'Connor's explanation
of invocations/benedictions from her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly).
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different purpose and effect when displayed within a church than
when displayed upon a hill in San Diego, or in a public park in San
Francisco, where both have remained for decades.241 So too for a
menorah displayed in a synagogue, versus the same definitionally
religious artifact placed in a civic building during the holiday
season.242
The question of context may be critical for resolving the
competing endorsement and coercion approaches. In Lee, Justice
Kennedy's application of his emerging coercion analysis recognized
the importance of the graduation ceremony in the life of a young
adult.2 43 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's opinion did not exten-
sively analyze the invocation and benediction practice within the
context of the ceremony. Furthermore, Justice Kennedy's opinion
notably lacked any discussion whatsoever regarding the history of the
challenged practice.
Justice O'Connor, the primary proponent of the endorsement
analysis, did not write in Lee. Previously, Justice O'Connor included
in her endorsement reformulation the concept of examining the
"history and ubiquity" 2" of a practice, its own "unique circum-
stances," 245 and context.2 46 However, Justice Blackmun's and
Justice Souter's opinions in Lee, both of which were joined by Justice
O'Connor, while written in the endorsement vein, did not closely
examine the graduation ceremony context, instead focusing upon the
Justices' perception of the primary effect of the challenged
practice.247
241. See Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Cal. 1991); Carpenter v. City & County
of San Francisco, 1992 WL 224490 (N.D.Cal. 1992).
242. See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 578; Okrand v. City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App.
3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1989).
243. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
244. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. hid at 595 (quoting Lynch v. Donney, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
246. Id. at 597 (Justice Blackmun, quoting Justice O'Connor from her concurrence in Lynch
and noting "government's use of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends
upon its context').
247. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2661-67 (Blacknun, J., concurring); id. at 2667-78 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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Judicial assumptions regarding the dispositive effect of a
dictionary definition versus the potentially compelling force of a
contextual analysis are critical to counsel's practical strategy. As
demonstrated by this discussion, counsel challenging a practice as
violative of the Establishment Clause is immediately in an
advantageous position if the court's attention can be riveted upon the
definitionally religious nature of the practice. Conversely, counsel
defending a practice must place the practice in context and seek to
inform the court regarding its historical background, all as part of
arguing that the activity has value and is worth preserving.248
Counsel's eventual success may be dependent upon this initial
judicial choice.
B. Considerations of History and Traditions
The question of preservation of what have arguably become
traditional practices under challenge in any particular factual
circumstance leads naturally to historical considerations.
Assumptions regarding history and the appropriate method of
applying history in Establishment Clause disputes can also be critical
to the evaluation of a practice's constitutionality. History may be
argued and applied both as to the general intended "purpose of the
248. By the same token, counsel must be careful not to overplay context and unintentionally
offend the court. Justice Arabian's concurring opinion in Sands v. Morongo School District illustrates
an analysis based upon context can cut both ways:
The present controversy demonstrates that Madison's concerns are well founded. In
arguing that their purpose is to solemnize high school graduation ceremonies, defendants
9ind amici curiae stress the civil or nonsectarian nature of benedictions and invocations.
The irony cannot go unnoticed, however, that the government's justification for the use
of religious rituals to achieve secular ends finds expression in terms which disparage
religion. [Citation.] In essence, the government defends the references to "our Lord" and
"Father" on the ground that the terms constitute little more than insipid symbols of a
shared secular culture.
If, however, prayer does serve to solemnize an occasion, then we must recognize and
identify it for what it is-a religious practice-and ask whether it has a legitimate
constitutional place in a public high school graduation ceremony.
Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 916-17, 809 P.2d 809, 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 68
(1991) (Arabian, J., concurring).
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Establishment Clause as illuminated by history,"24 9 and as to the
"history and ubiquity"250 of a specific challenged practice.
Establishment Clause history lies at the heart of both the
absolutist25 1 and historical approaches. 252 Absolutists ground
their position in the Jeffersonian wall metaphor, asserting an absolute
separation between church and state, 3 but critics, including Chief
Justice Rehnquist, have specifically attacked that historical
ground.' An historical analysis alone was sufficient to preserve
the long-standing practice of legislative invocations in Marsh v.
Chambers,55 without even referencing Lemon. However, the High
Court has also explicitly recognized that an unconstitutional action
does not become constitutional simply through long repetition.256
Nevertheless, despite the seeming importance of history, Justice
Kennedy in Lee held unconstitutional graduation invocations and
benedictions without addressing the history of the specific practice,
which is both long-standing in the United States and an historical
component of graduation ceremonies."5 7 Justice Souter engaged in
an historical analysis, but only to support his expressed adherence to
stare decisis.258 However, Justice Scalia, with three other justices
in dissent, vehemently objected to the majority's omission and
provided an analysis grounded in history.259 Thus, history remains
249. Walz v. Tax Commn, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970).
250. Allegheny, 392 U.S. at 625 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
251. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2667-71 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring);
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946);
see also supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text (discussing the "absolutist" approach).
252. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,92-107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 78 (1983).
253. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 15-16; see also supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text
(discussing Everson and the Jeffersonian wall metaphor).
254. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also ROBERT L. LORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1-82,109-145 (1982); RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLC PRAYER AND
THE CONsTrfrI1ON 125-32 (1987).
255. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
256. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 788-89.
257. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2652-61 (1992).
258. Id at 2667-78 (Souter, J., concurring).
259. Id. at 2678-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see KEvIN SI-EARD, AcADmmc HERALDRY IN
AmERICA (1962) (discussing the history of graduation ceremonies). The Sands plurality also notably
failed to conduct any historical analysis regarding the graduation ceremony, and Justice Panelli's
dissent objected to this omission. Sands v. Morongo Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 931, 809 P.2d 809,
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a key factor in Establishment Clause analysis and counsel must be
prepared to argue both general Establishment Clause history and the
specific background of the practice at issue.
A court's historical discussion may conceivably also be aimed at
public acceptance of the decision. It is difficult for the public to
accept judicial decisions invalidating long-standing and popular
religious components of civic life, particularly when it seems that the
history and common-sense of the matter has been lost in favor of
abstract legalisms.' 6 In Sands, Justice Arabian recognized and
attempted to address this reality by "plac[ing] before the people, as
Thomas Paine might have said, the common sense of the subject, not
merely in the idiom of the law, but in terms so plain, firm and true as
to compel their assent."2 61
Justice Arabian thereafter placed minority rights before the
people as the strongest basis for the necessity of the Sands
decision," yet in a judicial twist moved on to write in support of
the graduation invocation at issue in Sands on the basis of "the spirit
of religious freedom imminent in the constitution and our common
history.... " 63 In so doing, Justice Arabian spotlighted the judicial
dilemma regarding the organizing principles of diversity and
commonality, specifically regarding how a court can explain to the
public decisions in which individual rights and long-standing
historical practices collide, resulting in longstanding practices being
barred by the judicial branch. Assumptions regarding individuals are
thus critical in such cases.
853, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 78 (1991) (Panelli, J., dissenting).
260. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,312 (1952). In the Morongo Unified School District the
practice of allowing students to include invocations and benedictions within their graduation
ceremony had been continuous since at least 1937 at the oldest high school. In other San Bernardino
County school districts the practice had been traceable to the 1890's. The author's perception from
numerous public discussions is that this seemingly abrupt break in tradition is most troubling to the
public.
261. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 915, 809 P.2d at 842, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring).
262. Id
263. Id at 916, 809 P.2d at 843, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 67-68 (Arabian, J., concurring).
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C. The Establishment Clause Focus Upon the Individual-Where
Are We Going?
The constitutional duty to protect individual conscience264 lies
at the heart of the Establishment Clause, and is central to disputes
such as the graduation prayer line of cases. Thus, prevalent
assumptions regarding the individual and the Establishment Clause
must also be closely reexamined by bench and bar. One such
assumption surrounds the protection of minority rights.
1. Minority Rights-Questioning The Assumption Regarding
"Minority" Status For Establishment Clause Purposes
In Sands, Justice Arabian emphasized that it is critical to view the
issues surrounding the individual and the Establishment Clause from
the perspective of the minority, "be they discordant, harmonious, or
eloquently silent, for they compose a large segment of the symphony
which is America."265 Yet, it is actually difficult to generalize
regarding the "they" who is the minority,26 or about the "wide
264. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,2657 (1992) (noting that the Establishment Clause
embraces a freedom of conscience that specifically prohibits forms of state intervention in religious
activities).
265. Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 915, 809 P.2d at 842,281 Cal. Rptr. at 67 (Arabian, J., concurring);
see Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist., 608 F. Supp. 531 (D.C. Iowa 1985). In Graham, Chief
Judge Vietor stated:
It may well be that the majority of graduating seniors and the majority of the
population in the defendant school district would like to have an invocation and
benediction as part of the commencement exercises. However, the enforcement of
constitutional rights is not subject to the pleasure of the majority. It would be the
antithesis of the concept of constitutional law to apply the protection of the Constitution,
which is the fundamental law of our land, in any given situation only if the majority at
the relevant time and place approved. The Constitution protects all of us, including those
who are in the minority. Indeed, First Amendment rights (religion, speech, press,
peaceable assembly and petitioning for redress of grievances) would be meaningless if
they were not available to minorities, the unpopular, and those courageous enough to
speak out against the prevailing views of the majority and those entrusted with
governmental power.
Id. at 537.
266. See, e.g., Dimensions, EDUCATION WEEK, April 24, 1991, at 3 (setting forth a recent
extensive 13-month survey conducted by the ICR Survey Research Group for the City University of
New York on religion in America). The ICR survey yielded interesting results in terms of popular
generalizations on religious affiliation. For example, regarding the immigrant experience, the survey
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variety of belief and practice, " 267 or adherence of substantial
segments of our population "to non-Christian religions or to no
religions" 268 in Establishment Clause analysis. Religious adherence
and non-adherence sweep across all ethnic, gender and racial groups.
Both women and men are involved in a variety of religious
affiliations, including serving as clergy. Members of both sexes may
also be non-adherents. The civil rights movement in the United States
involved African-Americans, churches, and American religious
thought to a critical degree, unalterably improving American race
relations.2 69 The heritage of California's Hispanic population
includes traditions of the Catholic Church.27 ° But just such classes,
e.g., race, gender, national origin, while not necessarily "minorities"
for Establishment Clause purposes, are now considered protected
minorities for judicial equal protection analysis.27'
Perhaps minority status for Establishment Clause analysis is
assumed to mean non-Christian or non-Western. 272 However, not
only should the court not generalize regarding minority status, it
should avoid a judicial assumption or conclusion that reasonable
adherents to non-Christian or non-Western religions would object to
non-sectarian, non-denominational invocations and benedictions in
the tradition of the American civic culture during public ceremonies.
For example, Judaic opinion on public ceremonies and similar
found most Irish-Americans are Protestant, not Catholic, and most Arab-Americans and Asian-
Americans are Christian. Id
267. See, e.g., Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 884-85 & n.11, 809 P.2d at 821 & n.11, 281 Cal. Rptr. at
46 & n.11 (noting the religious diversity in the United States).
268. Id.
269. See DAviD J. CARROW, BEARING THE CROSS, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. AND THE
SOUMERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHM CONFERENCE (1988); see also STEPHEN B. OATES, LET THE
TRUMPETS SOUND, THE UFE OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 28-31, 37-39 (1982) (discussing the
specifically religious roots of the movements non-violence theory). California public schools honor
the life of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., each January for his philosophy and deeds. It is certainly
incongruous to honor Dr. King during the school year, yet not allow his fellow clergy to deliver
inspirational invocations or benedictions during graduations.
270. See ISIDRO LucAs, THE BROwNINa OF AMERICA, THE HISPANIC REVOLUTION IN THE
AMERIcAN CHURCH 55-68 (1981) (discussing "American Catholics, Hispanic Variety," and stating
most Hispanics would answer "yes" if asked if they were Catholic).
271. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMmuCAN CONSTrruriONAL LAw 1521-53 (2d ed. 1988).
272. See Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863,883-84,809 P.2d 809,821,281
Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 (1991) (Justice Kennard's closing remarks distinguishing between Christian and
non-Christian).
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practices is not uniform.273 Moreover, Islam shares a common
religious heritage and belief in a monotheistic Supreme Being with
Christianity and Judaism.274 Further, non-monotheistic Buddhist
principles of civility and tolerance toward other religions and systems
of thought are exemplified by an edict from early India which
concludes, "So concord is good: let all listen, and be willing to listen
to the doctrines professed by others."275 Non-Western Hinduism is
also tolerant of other persons' views:
An important consequence of this (religious principle) is tolerance,
nonviolence considered an active virtue; this is a manner of acting which
must be respected-even in the political sphere-regardless of the attitude
of others.276
Certainly a judge can look for division among religions,277 but
judges should not ignore co-existing principles of mutual tolerance
and commonality. The concept of basic commonality among the
world's religions is aptly summed up by the following insight from
Nobel Laureate Mother Teresa:
273. See JAMES D. HUNTER, CuLTURE WARS: THE STRuGGLE TO DEPE AMERICA 263-266
(1991) (citing the 1987-1988 Williamsburg Charter Survey on Religion and American Public Life).
Hunter posits that much of current debate on such issues is inter-denominational, by and between
what he terms more conservative "orthodox" theologians and clergy, and those of a more liberal
"progressive" outlook. Id at 67-132. For example, Rabbi Gutterman delivered the invocations and
benedictions at issue in Lee, yet plaintiffs challenging the practice were also of the same religion.
274. See ALBERT H. HoURANI, A HISTORY o1 THE ARAB PEoPLES 14-21,62-65 (1991); JoHN
A. WILIAMS, IsLAM, GREAT REuoIONS OF MODERN MAN (1962).
275. See RiCHARD A. GARD, BUDDmSM, GREAT RELIoIONS OF MODERN MAN 18-19 (1962)
(quoting Buddhist Emperor Ashoka (d.238 BC)).
One should not know only one's own religion and condemn the religion of others, but one
should know other's religions for this or that reason. So doing, one helps one's own
religion to grow and renders service to the religions of others too. In acting otherwise, one
digs the grave of one's own religion and also does harm to other religions. Whosoever
honors his own religion and condemns other religions, does so indeed through devotion
to his own religion, thinking, 'I will glorify my own religion.' But on the contrary, in so
doing he injures his own religion more gravely. So concord is good: let all listen and be
willing to listen to the doctrines professed by others.
276. LOUIS N. RENOU, HINDUISM, GREAT RELIGIONS oF MODERN MAN, 55-56 (1962).
277. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 883-84, 809 P.2d 809,
821, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 46 (1991) (Justice Kennard noting the "violence tragically associated with
political division along religious lines").
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Throughout the ages, the scriptures of all religions have proclaimed that
humanity is one great family. This is a simple truth, and it is simply and
directly stated in every religion. In fact, almost all the principles that are
associated with religious thought are shared by every religion.
278
Thus, at a minimum, principles of commonality, mutual tolerance,
and civility among both Western and non-Western religions establish
that prayers in the tradition of the American civic culture should not
be held per se offensive to reasonable adherents of numerically
minority religions.279 Indeed, this assumption ignores the unifying
force of religion among superficially disparate multi-cultural
groups."' 0 In the past, the United States Supreme Court has noted
that "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being."28 1 Public attachment to the national motto "In
God We Trust,"28 2 religious symbols on currency, including the
concept "E Pluribus Unum" (one out of many),8 3 the Pledge of
Allegiance, legislative and inaugural invocations,2 all suggest that
commonly held religious sentiments can and do create a sense of
oneness and unity. President Lincoln's "Springfield Address" fully
278. JEFFREY MosEs, ONENESS, GREAT PRINCIPLES SHARED BY ALL RELIGIONS 1 (1989).
279. See, e.g., Sands, 53 Cal. 3d at 895, 809 P.2d at 828, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (Lucas, CJ.,
concurring).
If one elects to participate, he or she may infuse the brief exercise with personal beliefs
and emotions, particularly since the references to God are 'weak symbols' which readily
conform to individual interpretation. As one commentator observes: 'Mhe religious use
of the term 'God' comes as close as possible to a generic religious persons' specific
beliefs. Not only can all traditional Western and Eastern theists interpret the symbol to fit
their specific faith, but Native American Indians and even most Buddhists can do so.
Robert Bellah has rightly noted that 'God' is 'a word which almost all Americans can
accept but which means so many different things to so many different people that it is
almost an empty sign.' Thus, the symbol permits religious diversity in our pluralistic
society.'
IL
280. The author has been fortunate to attend a privately sponsored celebration honoring the life
and work of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., held each January in the Sacramento Community Center.
There is no doubt the invocation, benediction and religious music, including the closing hymn "We
Shall Overcome," brings a thoroughly multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-generational audience
together as one.
281. Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
282. 36 U.S.C. § 186 (1981).
283. See HUNTER, supra note 273, at 307-308 (discussing the concept that our society has
certain commonly held religious beliefs).
284. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
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succeeds in setting forth a common bond among his listeners,
rhetorically creating a confident sense of community despite distance,
and a belief that we as discrete individuals are all in this society
together.
285
2. How Will Courts Determine That The Individual Has
Been Coerced?
Another assumption respecting the individual and the
Establishment Clause that should be questioned is reliance upon
sociological studies or psychological research. In Lee, Justice
Kennedy cites such research to support his concerns regarding
adolescent peer pressure impacting invocations and benedictions,
286
an approach bitterly criticized by Justice Scalia.2 87 Yet, in Board of
Education v. Mergens,288 a High Court majority cited such studies
and academic articles to support the independent and critical thinking
ability of high school students and rejected an Establishment Clause
challenge to the Equal Access Act.289 Even if reliance upon the
social science approach does not yield the catastrophic results
predicted by Justice Scalia,29 Lee and Mergens do illustrate the
elasticity of this method of legal argument.
Common law and statutory judgments about the maturity levels
of individual adolescents are time-tested or democratically reached
by legislators and, arguably, are more on target. Society itself, as
exemplified by common law and statute, does not view young adults
attending a farewell high school graduation ceremony to be so
impressionable as to consider a brief invocation or benediction in the
context of a ceremony an establishment or advancement of religion.
285. LARRY SHAPIRo, ABRAHAM LINCOLN, MYsTIC CHORDS OF MEMORY, A SELECTION OF
LINcoLN's WRITINos 37 (1984).
286. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. CL 2649, 2659 (1992).
287. Id. at 2681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
289. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250. In Mergens, the High Court specifically recognized the maturity
level of high school students stating: "We think that secondary school students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely
permits on a nondiscretionary basis." Ld
290. See Lee, 112 S. CL at 2682, 2686 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Many such young adults will soon be entering college. Furthermore,
in California all eighteen-year-old young adults are deemed mature
and responsible enough to hold public office, 291 vote,2 92 marry,
enter into a contract, and own real property.293 Even prior to age
eighteen, young adults have been judged mature enough to operate
a motor vehicle with consent, 294 suffer suspension or expulsion
from school as a result of their own actions,295 commit crimes,
296
obtain confidential medical services without parental consent,297 or
authorize health treatment in certain circumstances.291
When a court is moving beyond the public school context post-
Lee, it will be difficult for bench or bar to rely upon psychological or
sociological research regarding coercion because such research may
not meet evidentiary burdens of proof, particularly since social
science studies often conflict and can fly in the face of common-
sense experience. For example, are individuals objectively or
subjectively coerced when viewing a cross on a hill,299 a religious
motto on a city seal,3" biblical statuary in a park,3"' a holiday
display of religious artifacts,' or when listening to an inspirational
invocation or benediction in a public ceremony? Moving beyond the
question of ceremonies or displays, would individuals be coerced for
Establishment Clause purposes if and when tax funds are spent by
way of vouchers at a private parochial school?
Any successful evolution of the coercion test as set forth by
Justice Kennedy in Lee and County ofAllegheny may well depend on
a necessary shift from sociological or psychological research to an
291. CAL GOv'T CODE § 1020 (Deerings 1982).
292. CAL CO NST. art I, § 2.
293. CAL CIV. CODE § 25 (Deerings 1990).
294. CAL. VEH. CODE § 17701 (Deerings 1984).
295. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48900 et seq. (Deerings 1987 & Supp. 1992).
296. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (Deerings 1985).
297. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 46010.1 (Deerings 1987).
298. CAL CIV. CODE §§ 25.9, 34.5 (Deerings 1990).
299. See Carpenter v. City & County of San Francisco, 1992 WL 224490 (N.D.Cal. 1992);
Murphy v. Bilbray, 782 F. Supp. 1420 (S.D. Cal. 1991); Fox v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792,
587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978).
300. Harris v. City of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
301. Hewitt v. Joyner, 940 F.2d 1561 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 969 (1992).
302. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Okrand v.
City of Los Angeles, 207 Cal. App. 3d 566, 254 Cal. Rptr. 913 (1989).
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analysis of the evidentiary facts to establish coercion. The above
discussion of Mergens and Lee demonstrates the changeability of
results based, in part, on reliance upon social studies, as well as the
seemingly more substantial and objective determination regarding
maturity levels made by common law or statute. Since such
Establishment Clause cases are typically decided as a matter of
law,3"3 Justice Scalia may be on firmer ground in the long run by
grounding his theory of a coercion test upon identifiable legal
compulsion rather than academic research. 3 Bench and bar in
Establishment Clause cases must now wrestle with this division
between Justices Kennedy and Scalia.
3. Individual Conscience Versus Individual Sensitivities
The final essential underlying assumption regarding diversity,
commonality, and tolerance to be addressed by the bench and bar in
all such cases is the question of individual conscience versus
individual sensitivities. As set forth above, both Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the majority in Lee v. Weisman and Justice Kennard's
opinion in Sands v. Morongo School District focus upon the
protection of each individual's freedom of conscience-to believe or
not believe in any deity, to be either an adherent or nonadherent of
any religious system-which lies without a doubt at the core of the
First Amendment's ban on the establishment of religion by the State.
But freedom of conscience should not be presumed genuinely
impacted each and every time religious activity, displays, or speech
are connected with public events sponsored or supported in some way
by the federal, state, or local governments. There is a qualitative
difference between genuine freedom of conscience and an
individual's personal desire not to listen to any religious speech or
view any religious display with which they are uncomfortable or do
not agree.
455
303. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Establishment Clause
decisions are decided as a matter of law).
304. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2683 (1992) (Scalia, L, dissenting).
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The author has no doubts that State-mandated school day prayer
directly and adversely impacts individual freedom of conscience and
violates the Establishment Clause for all the reasons set forth in
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard:
The Court has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance with
the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Families
entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition
their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be
used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs
of the student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are
impressionable and their attendance is involuntary. The State exerts great
authority and coercive power through mandatory attendance requirements,
and because of the student's emulation of teachers as role models and the
children's susceptibility to peer pressure.305
But, it must also be stated that the key concerns set forth in Edwards
by Justice Brennan-state coercive authority, the closed nature of a
classroom, advancement of particular religious views in such
classrooms, impressionable children of all age and grade levels,
involuntary attendance, role modeling and peer pressure-are not
present in student planned, voluntary graduation ceremonies held
once a year with a limited audience, including parents.
Thus, rather than protection of the individual's genuine freedom
of conscience, Lee fell on the other side of the line into judicial
concern for individual sensitivities. Plaintiffs in Lee were no doubt
uncomfortable with invocations and benedictions and considered
such ceremonial speech offensive. 6 But, short of adopting an easy
absolutist approach sanitizing religion from all public discourse, there
will always be some expression, whether as seemingly harmless as
the invocation which opens United States Supreme Court
sessions. 7 or the reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance,
305. Edwards v. Aguiltard, 482 U.S. 578, 583-84 (1987).
306. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
307. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38,84-85 (1985) (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice
Burger noted with particular irony the following:
Some who trouble to read the opinions in these cases will find it ironic-perhaps even
bizarre-that on the very day we heard arguments in the cases, the Court's session opened
with the invocation for Divine protection. Across the park a few yards away, the House
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which someone somewhere will find offensive. However, Justice
Kennedy's Lee opinion rejects subjective feelings of offense as an
Establishment Clause standard, stating: "[O]ffense alone does not in
every case show a violation [of the Establishment Clause].""'
Thus, unless American society was to somehow collectively agree to
extirpate all religious references from public life, the principle of
mutual tolerance becomes critical as a practical ethic in resolving this
quandary.
V. MuTUAL TOLERANCE
The Establishment Clause issues involving public ceremony and
ritual raised by this Article, which were particularly apparent in the
graduation prayer line of cases, are not new. Samuel Adams
responded to concerns that an invocation would be divisive in
opening the Continental Congress by remarking "he was no bigot,
and could hear a prayer from a gentleman of piety and virtue, who
was at the same time a friend to his country."" 9 This idea of mutual
tolerance spoken by Mr. Adams refers to one person's ability to listen
to another of differing viewpoint or religious background. Bigotry in
this view refers to an unwillingness to so listen. While mutual
tolerance would never support proselytizing during a civic occasion,
a societal and individual ethic of mutual tolerance as intimated by
Samuel Adams would not forestall the act of listening or require
sanitizing long-standing non-denominational, non-sectarian
invocations and benedictions from all public ceremony.
of Representatives and the Senate regularly open each session with a prayer. These
legislative prayers are not just one minute in duration, but are extended, thoughtful
invocations and prayers for divine guidance.
I&
308. Lee, 112 S. C. at 2661. Justice Kennedy stated:
We do not hold that every State action implicating religion is invalid if one or a few
citizens find it offensive. People may take offense at all manner of religious as well as
non-religious messages, but offense alone does not in every case show a violation.
Id.
309. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791-92 (1983) (citing 1 A. STOKEs, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNrrED STATES 449 (1950)).
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Reflecting an alternate viewpoint, a contemporary academic
political analyst recently wrote:
That is why our history has been selectively re-written, foisting on us a
premature ecumenism and mythical amity of 'Judeo-Christian' elements.
But it is our task, in a society of increasing complex articulation, to
complete the effort of Madison in removing religion from state ceremony
and proclamations. We appreciate better than Lincoln's contemporaries
did his use of religious language to question the complacent view that God
is in agreement with armies that invoked him. We value more those who
follow conscience to deny that a once-Christian culture must have a
Christian state. A modem prophet like Dr. King makes us understand the
witness of those who found the 'Christian state' ungodly in its blessing of
things like slavery.
310
Tolerance in this context refers to freeing religion completely from
governmental influences. President Lincoln and Dr. King, Jr., in this
view, do not stand for their invoking the "better angels of our
nature," 311 or for the commonality of all Americans as human
beings through timeless deistic imagery, but rather as persons using
religious speech to question complacency and agitate the public and
government on moral questions of the day. Under this viewpoint,
tolerance frankly requires completing the effort to remove religion
from all State ceremony and proclamation in order to give full
expression to the individual conscience." 2 Yet, in this perspective,
there is little or no tolerance toward those high school graduates who
chose in the past, through their self-governance structures, to enjoy
a traditional graduation ceremony and rite of passage to the next
phase of their life with all available pomp and circumstance,
310. GARY WILLS, UNDER GOD: RELIGION AND AMERICAN PoLTcs 383 (1990).
311. See U.S. GOV'T PRININO OFFICE, INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON, 1789 TO GEORGE BUSH, 1989 133, 141 (Bicentennial
ed. 1989) (frst inaugural address of Abraham Lincoln).
312. WHuS, supra note 310 at 384-85. Mr. Wills points out:
Religion has, admittedly, been a powerful force for social stability, supporting indirectly
the regime that offers free exercise to all beliefs; but it has also been a prophetic voice
of resistance to power when that is unchecked by moral insight. The cleric in jail is an
American tradition, the conscientious objector, the practitioner of civil disobedience.
ICE
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including the long-standing religious invocation and benediction.
3 13
Perhaps even more importantly, what eventually becomes of the
reality of community and ideals of unity?314 Are judicial steps
banning long-standing community traditions including religious
references truly necessary to genuinely protect individual conscience,
rather than particularized sensitivities?
Basic principles of mutual tolerance and civility would urge to the
contrary, suggesting that individuals present at a ceremony whose
sensitivities are such that they do not personally like non-sectarian,
non-denominational invocations and benedictions, nevertheless
listen, as did Samuel Adams, out of courtesy and respect to those
fellow citizens who include such a traditional element within the
particular celebration. Society and the courts certainly expect no less
of individuals who, in the graduation context, feel personally
uncomfortable with the music selected by the students, or even who
might vehemently object to unpopular themes expressed in the
speech of a student valedictorian. In other First Amendment free
speech contexts, the sensitivity or emotions of the listener are only
rarely allowed to control the content of speech, and when allowed,
can only narrowly control such content.315
CONCLUSION
The state of flux in Establishment Clause law continues unabated
and the debate will continue between justices of a deeply split High
Court. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Lee v. Weisman
explicitly leaves unresolved the specific issue of invocations and
313. This issue was starkly raised in Sands v. Morongo Unified School District, where no
participant, student or parent, objected to the practice, and the components of their ceremony,
including the invocations and benedictions, were left to the students themselves. See Sands v.
Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. 863, 869, 809 P.2d 809, 811, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 36 (1991)
(describing plaintiffs in this action as "taxpayers residing within the District").
314. See generally ARTm M. SCHLESSiNOER, JR., Tim DisUNTNw OF AMECA:
RLEONS ON A MUL11-CULTMUAL SOCIETY (1992).
315. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (hate crime decision
noting the First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech because of
disapproval with the ideas expressed); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,407-08 (1989) (flag burning
case noting the very purpose of protecting freedom of speech is to invite dispute).
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benedictions at public ceremonies "if the affected citizens are mature
adults.... "316 This Article suggests the First Amendment does not
per se compel sanitizing the non-sectarian, non-denominational
invoking of God from all traditional public ceremonies and rituals.
Such benign traditional acknowledgments of religion have not served
to establish a State religion, or a religious faith, in over 200 years of
American history, nor should such acknowledgments tend to do so
now.
Pursuant to the Establishment Clause, and any post-Lee test set
forth by the Supreme Court of the United States to implement
Establishment Clause principles, reasonable adherents or non-
adherents should not be assumed to perceive historical invocations
and benedictions within the context of a public ceremony to be an
establishment of religion, or even an endorsement or advancement of
religion.
As this nation becomes increasingly diverse, it is all the more
important that society focus upon principles of mutual tolerance and
civility. Such tolerance must mutually extend to traditional as well as
non-traditional, and conventional as well as unconventional,
ceremonial practices. Otherwise, the "common sense of the
matter" 17 will increasingly be lost, and the State and religion far
closer to becoming "aliens to each other, hostile, suspicious, and even
unfriendly." 31
8
316. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659 (1992).
317. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952).
318. Id. at 312.
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